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Every Day Counts:  
Proposals to Reform IDEA’s  
Due Process Structure 
Elizabeth A. Shaver† 
Abstract 
It is a core principle of special education legislation that the parents 
of children with disabilities can challenge the child’s educational 
programming through an administrative due process hearing. Yet for 
years the special education due process structure has been criticized as 
inefficient, anticollaborative, and prohibitively expensive. Those crit-
icisms have given rise to widely varying proposals to reform special 
education due process, proposals that range from adding certain 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to a wholesale replacement 
of the due process structure. 
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of special education 
dispute resolution. The article first examines the lively debate among 
scholars and special interest groups about perceived deficiencies of 
IDEA due process and various proposals to remedy those deficiencies. 
The article then sets forth the results of a nationwide survey in which 
over three hundred and fifty special education attorneys voiced their 
opinions about the current structure and some proposals for reform. 
Finally, the article recommends certain structural changes to IDEA due 
process that are designed to improve the efficiency and reduce the cost 
of special education dispute resolution. 
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Introduction 
The ability of parents to challenge the educational programming of 
a child with a disability is crucial since every day that a child does not 
receive an appropriate education is a day of learning that is lost forever. 
For this reason, it has long been a fixture of special education law that 
parents are entitled to a due process hearing in which they can advocate 
for the needs of their child.1 
A special education dispute should be resolved quickly to ensure 
that the child receives appropriate educational services at the earliest 
possible date.2 An equally important goal is that special education due 
process is accessible to all children with disabilities regardless of family 
wealth. Yet critics argue that special education due process currently 
does not serve these goals, either because of the lack of “collaborative 
and non-adversarial” means for families and school districts to resolve 
disputes quickly3 or the prohibitive costs associated with due process.4 
 
1. See, e.g., Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 
279, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874–76 
(D.D.C. 1972); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400–1415 (2012). 
2. A special education dispute should be resolved through an administrative due 
process hearing in no more than seventy-five days. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b) 
(2007) (setting 30-day period for resolution session); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) 
(2007) (setting 45-day timeline for hearing officer to render a decision). 
3. Philip Moses & Timothy Heeden, Collaborating for Our Children’s Future: 
Mediating Special Education Disputes, 18 Disp. Resol. Mag. 4, 5 (2012). 
4. See infra Part II. 
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In 2004, when Congress last amended the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act5 (IDEA), Congress found that parents and 
school districts needed “expanded opportunities to resolve their 
disagreements in positive and constructive ways.”6 To accomplish this 
goal, Congress added or expanded alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms that are triggered once a due process complaint is filed. 
IDEA now requires the parties to attend a “resolution session” that 
must take place within fifteen days after a due process complaint is 
filed, unless both parties agree to waive the session.7 IDEA also provides 
expanded opportunities to mediate a special education dispute.8 Both 
the resolution session and mediation can delay an adjudicated 
resolution of the dispute.9 
Advocacy organizations and scholars contend that, even with these 
dispute resolution mechanisms in place, special education dispute 
resolution still is too expensive and time-consuming.10 School admin-
istrators assert that the litigation costs are so high that school districts 
often agree to provide services not required by IDEA.11 Advocates for 
children and parents contend that due process is too expensive for most 
parents who cannot afford to pay the attorneys and expert witnesses 
whose participation is essential in a due process hearing.12 
The continued debate over the structure of IDEA due process has 
yielded widely varying proposals for reform. Some advocates propose 
that IDEA should include ADR mechanisms in addition to the reso-
lution session and mediation.13 Others propose increased governmental 
enforcement of IDEA’s provisions or expanded low-cost or pro bono 
 
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1415 (2012).  
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8). 
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B). 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). 
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(c)(3) (2007). 
10. Sasha Pudelski, Am. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, Rethinking Special 
Education Due Process 7 (2013), http://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Policy_and_Advocacy/Public_Policy_Resources/Special_Education/ 
AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf [http://perma.cc/XNT6-2E7J]. 
11. Id. at 2–3. 
12. Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families without Means: Causes and 
Corrections From the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 Am. 
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 107, 113 (2011). 
13. Tracy G. Mueller, IEP Facilitation: A Promising Approach to Resolving 
Conflicts Between Parents and Families, 41 Teaching Exceptional 
Child. 60, 61 (2009) (discussing IEP facilitation); S. James Rosenfeld, 
It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, 21 J. Nat’l. 
Ass’n. Admin. L. Judiciary 544, 546–47 (2012) (proposing that IDEA 
include a process for voluntary, binding arbitration). 
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legal services for lower income parents.14 At least one special interest 
group, the American Association of School Administrators (AASA), has 
proposed a radical overhaul of due process procedures in which the 
parties must engage in several mandatory procedures before litigation 
can be filed.15 Still others propose that the due process structure 
essentially remain the same with only modest reforms designed to 
increase efficiency and reduce cost.16 
This article explores the merits of these various proposals to reform 
special education dispute resolution. As part of this exploration, the 
article includes the results of a survey that asked special education 
attorneys about the current structure and certain proposals to modify 
the structure. Finally, the article recommends certain structural 
changes designed to reduce the expense and time needed to resolve a 
special education dispute. 
Part I of the article provides historical background on special 
education due process and a description of IDEA’s current due process 
procedures. Part II of the article describes the ongoing debate about 
the efficacy and accessibility of due process and the various proposals 
for change. Part III of the article describes the results of a nationwide 
survey of special education practitioners regarding the current structure 
and some of the proposals for change. Part IV of the article recommends 
certain structural changes to due process procedures. 
At the end of the day, regardless of whether the parties use ADR 
mechanisms to settle a dispute or adjudicate the dispute in a due 
process hearing, the ultimate goal is to resolve special education 
disputes quickly and efficiently so that the child’s education does not 
suffer. The IDEA procedures should ensure that every day of school 
counts for the child. 
I. IDEA’s Due Process Procedures 
A. Early Origins of Special Education Due Process 
Before 1975, federal law did not provide children with disabilities 
in the United States with the right to attend public school, although 
some states did provide special education services.17 In the early 1970s, 
 
14. See Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty and The Limits of 
Private Enforcement, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1413, 1430–33 (2011) 
(discussing the wealth disparities in enforcement of IDEA). 
15.  Pudelski, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
16. Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 Ohio St. J. on 
Disp. Resol. 495, 495 (2014). 
17. Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped 
Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 349, 355 (1990). 
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advocates for children with disabilities won two key cases18 by drawing 
heavily from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education,19 in which the Court ruled that racially segregated education 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 
The two landmark cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Citizens v. Pennsylvania21 (PARC) and Mills v. Board of Education of 
the District of Columbia,22 established, among other rights, that parents 
of a child with a disability would be entitled to “notice” and “an 
opportunity to be heard” whenever educators made decisions about 
educational services for the child.23 
Robust due process rights were a key focus in both PARC and Mills 
because then-existing state statutes and school policies allowed school 
districts to exclude from public school any child deemed “uneducable,” 
without any notice to or input from the child’s parents.24 In PARC, the 
parties executed a Consent Agreement that set forth very detailed due 
process provisions. Parents were entitled to receive written notice when-
ever a school district proposed to initiate or change special education 
services.25 The Consent Agreement provided that the notice would: 
 “[D]escribe the proposed action in detail,” including, among other 
things, a “statement of the reasons” for the proposed action and 
information about any “tests or reports” upon which the proposed 
action was based;26 
 Inform parents of their right to a hearing before any proposed action 
would take place;27 
 Inform parents of their rights (a) to have counsel (or any other 
person) at the hearing, (b) to review the child’s school records,  
18. Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, (E.D. 
Pa. 1972); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
20.  Id. at 495. 
21. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
22. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
23.  Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, 343 F. Supp. at 292 (E.D. Pa. 1972); 
Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 883 (D.D.C. 1972). 
24. See, e.g., Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 
at 282 n.3 (quoting Pennsylvania statutes that permitted a school district 
to exclude a child from school if a school psychologist determined that the 
child was “uneducable or untrainable”). 
25. Id. at 303–05. 
26. Id. at 304. 
27. Id. 
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including any tests or reports upon which the proposed action was 
based, (c) to present any evidence at the hearing, including expert 
medical, psychological and educational testimony, and (d) to call as a 
witness any school official, employee, or agent of a school district;28 
and 
 Inform parents of the procedures by which they could pursue a 
hearing, among other items.29 
The PARC Consent Agreement further specified how the hearing 
was to be conducted.30 The hearing was to be scheduled between fifteen 
and thirty days after receipt of the parents’ request for a hearing.31 The 
hearing officer was to be “the Secretary of Education” or a person 
designated by the Secretary, but could not be “an officer, employee or 
agent” of the school district.32 The hearing officer’s decision was to be 
based “solely upon the evidence presented” and the hearing officer must 
have found that the proposed change was supported by “substantial 
evidence” presented at the hearing.33 The parents had a right to be 
represented at the hearing and to present any evidence or testimony, 
including expert medical, psychological, or educational testimony.34 The 
hearing officer was to render a decision within twenty days after the 
hearing, and the decision was to contain “written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.”35 The parents were entitled to a transcript of the 
hearing record.36 Importantly, the child’s educational status could not 
change during the notice and hearing process except in “extraordinary 
circumstances” after written notice to and approval by a representative 
of the state board of education.37 
B. Congress Enacts Special Education Legislation 
In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHCA), which provided federal funding for special 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 304–05. 
31. Id. at 305. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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education services.38 The EAHCA conditioned the States’ receipt of 
federal funding upon compliance with the statute’s requirement that 
each child with a disability receive a “free appropriate public 
education,” or FAPE.39 Through the EAHCA, Congress leveraged its 
Spending Clause powers to essentially require all States to provide 
special education services to children with disabilities.40 
The EAHCA represented the culmination of several years of federal 
legislative activity in the field of special education. Congress first 
provided federal funds for states to develop special education programs 
as early as 1965 when Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA).41 In 1966, Congress added Title VI to the 
ESEA, entitled “Education of the Handicapped Children.”42 Among 
other things, then-Title VI established a Bureau for the Education of 
the Handicapped and a National Advisory Committee on Handicapped 
Children.43 In 1970, Congress enacted the Education of the Handi-
capped Act,44 which consolidated prior federal legislation regarding 
special education initiatives into one piece of legislation.45 
In 1974, after the PARC and Mills cases were decided, Congress 
amended the Education of the Handicapped Act to provide due process 
rights to parents of children with disabilities.46 In considering those 
amendments, Congress reviewed the PARC and Mills decisions as well 
as reports and scholarly articles on the topic of due process.47 While not 
 
38. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301). 
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012). 
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012) (setting for the requirement that States draft and 
implement policies and procedures in order to qualify for federal funds). 
41. Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 503(a)(10), 79 Stat. 27, 49–50 (1965). 
42. Pub L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
Twenty-Second Annual Report to Congress on the Implement-
ation of the IDEA at vi (2000), http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/ 
annual/osep/2000/preface.pdf [http://perma.cc/DWL6-7MDZ]. 
43. Pub L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966). 
44. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970). 
45. See Weber, supra note 17, at 357 (describing early federal legislative efforts). 
46. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974). 
47. In March 1973, the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate’s 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings in which a large 
number of printed materials were reviewed, including the PARC and Mills 
decisions, a report entitled “A Continuing Summary of Pending and 
Completed Litigation Regarding the Education of Handicapped Children” 
edited by the Council for Exceptional Children, and a Syracuse University 
law review article entitled Appropriate Education for All Handicapped 
Children: A Growing Issue authored by Frederick Weintraub and Alan 
Abelson. See Education for the Handicapped, 1973: Hearing Before the 
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terribly detailed, the due process provisions of the 1974 Education of 
the Handicapped Act48 borrowed heavily from the due process proce-
dures outlined in PARC and Mills.49 Yet the legislative history reveals 
no discussion by Congress as to whether those due process procedures 
were the optimal means to resolve special education disputes.50 
One year later, Congress amended the Education of the Handi-
capped Act and created comprehensive special education legislation 
known as the EAHCA.51 In the EAHCA, Congress created a statutory 
section entitled “Procedural Safeguards” with very detailed due process 
procedures.52 Once again, Congress drew heavily from the due process 
requirements of PARC and Mills.53 
For example, the EAHCA required the school district to provide 
written notice to the parents54 whenever the district either proposed or 
refused to “initiate or change . . . the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to the child.”55 If necessary, that notice would have to 
be in the parents’ native language.56 The statute also specified that 
parents be afforded the opportunity file a complaint and an opportunity 
for an impartial due process hearing to be conducted either by the 
 
Subcomm. on Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 
93rd Cong. 39, 155 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearing]. 
48. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 613(A), 88 Stat. 484, 582 (1974). 
49. A 1975 Senate Report stated that the 1974 Amendments “incorporated 
the major principles of the right to education cases.” See S. Rep. No. 94-
168, at 8 (1975). 
50. The Senate Conference Report that accompanies the 1974 Amendments 
to the Education of the Handicapped Act only obliquely refers to the due 
process procedures, noting that the amendments “require[] States to 
provide procedures for insuring that . . . safeguards in decisions regarding 
identification, evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped 
children.” See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1026, at 193 (1974). 
51. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
52. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615, 89 Stat. 773, 788 (1975). 
53. Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator’s Perspective, 
3 Vt. L. Rev. 71, 76 (1978) (noting that the EAHCA “codified rights already 
spelled out in earlier court decisions”). Senator Stafford served on the Senate 
Subcommittee on the Handicapped. See Weber, supra note 17, at ii. 
54. A “parent” under both the EAHCA and the current IDEA is defined to 
mean more than just the child’s biological parents. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(10)(F)(23) (2012). 
55. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615(b)(1)(C)(ii), 89 Stat. 773, 788. 
56. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615(b)(1)(D), 89 Stat. 773, 788. 
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school district (labeled the “local educational agency” in the statute) or 
the state educational agency.57 
As to the manner in which the hearing would be conducted, the 
statute provided that any party had the right (a) “to be accompanied 
and advised by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or 
training with respect to the problems of handicapped children,” (b) to 
“present evidence,” (c) to compel the attendance of witnesses who could 
be subject to cross-examination, (d) to a “written or electronic verbatim 
record” of the hearing, and (e) to receive “written findings of fact and 
decisions.”58 
The EAHCA gave the States some discretion in designing a due 
process structure. The statute allowed each State to determine individ-
ually whether the impartial due process hearing would be held at the 
local level or the state agency level.59 If the hearing was conducted at 
the local level, the State could choose to have the parties file an appeal 
with the state educational agency, a proceeding in which a state agency-
appointed review officer would make an “independent decision” on the 
matter after an impartial review of the hearing.60 Thereafter, either 
party could file suit in either state or federal court.61 Alternatively, the 
State could choose not to require a state-level administrative appeal 
before either party could file suit in state or federal court. 
These two alternative structures are known as “one-tier” and “two-
tier” structures.62 In a two-tier system, the impartial due process 
hearing is conducted at the local level, and the appeal of a hearing 
officer’s decision is filed with the state educational agency before a party 
can file suit in court.63 In a one-tier system, following a hearing officer’s 
decision, a party may file suit directly in federal or state court.64 
This ability to select either a one-tier or a two-tier system still exists 
in IDEA today.65 However, in the last twenty years, the states increase-
 
57. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615(b)(1)(E), 89 Stat. 773, 788; Pub. L. No. 94-142, 
§ 615(b)(2), 89 Stat. 773, 788. 
58. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615(d)(1)–(4), 89 Stat. 773, 789. 
59. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615(c), 89 Stat. 773, 789. 
60. Id. 
61. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615(e)(2), 89 Stat. 773, 789. 
62. Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A 
State-by-State Survey, 21 J. Disability Pol’y Stud. 3, 4 (2010). 
63. See e.g., Ohio Admin. Code 3301-51-05(K)(14) (2014) (outlining a two-
tiered system). 
64. See e.g., 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 301-8:2220-R-6.02 (West 2014) (creating 
a one-tiered system). 
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2012); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2012). 
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ingly have adopted a one-tier system.66 Currently, forty-one states and 
the District of Columbia have a one-tier system.67 
The due process structure that was first enacted in the EAHCA 
and is still in effect today depends almost entirely upon private 
enforcement of a child’s rights by his parents.68 In almost every instance, 
a child’s parents are responsible to advocate for the child at the 
administrative level and, if necessary, in state or federal court.69 
C. The 1990 and 1997 Amendments to IDEA 
In 1990, when Congress amended and reauthorized the EAHCA, it 
renamed the statute the Individual with Disabilities Education Act.70 
The IDEA was again reauthorized and amended in both 1997 and 
2004.71 
Before the 1997 amendments, IDEA did not provide for any form 
of ADR, although mediation had been suggested as early as 1976 when 
the Commissioner of Education issued the implementing regulations for 
the EAHCA.72 In addition, the 1990 Amendments had authorized the 
 
66. Zirkel & Scala, supra note 62, at 5.  
67. Id.; 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 301-8:2220-R-6.02 (West 2014) (moving Colorado 
from a two-tier structure to a one-tier structure beginning in 2011). 
68. S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 14 (1975) (explaining that the goal of the EAHCA was 
to “provide and reinforce procedural protections for parents and children”). 
69. IDEA does provide for a “state complaint procedure” that allows any 
individual or organization to file a complaint with a state educational agency 
regarding an alleged violation of IDEA by a local educational agency. See 34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.151, 300.153 (2012). State complaints can involve allegations 
regarding the services provided to an individual child or a systematic, 
generalized violation of IDEA. Such a complaint is filed with the state 
educational agency, which conducts an investigation and issues a decision. 
See Ruth Colker, Special Education Complaint Resolution: Ohio, 29 Ohio 
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 371, 371–73 (2014) (describing state complaint 
procedures). While the state complaint procedure is an inexpensive means to 
seek resolution of a special education dispute, it has significant limitations, 
including a one-year statute of limitations, the lack of any hearing or other 
means to assess credibility of witnesses, and limitations on the type of relief 
that can be ordered. Id. In addition, parents do not control the progress of 
the investigation as they do when a due process complaint is filed. 
70. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (1990). 
71. Individuals with Disabilities Amendment Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
17, 111 Stat. 37; Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2467. 
72. In issuing regulations relating to procedural safeguards under the EAHCA, 
the Commissioner of Education included a comment, which stated as follows: 
Many States have pointed to the success of using mediation as an 
intervening step prior to conducting a formal due process hearing. 
Although the process of mediation is not required by the statute or 
these regulations, an agency may wish to suggest mediation in 
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Secretary of Education to make grants to explore the resolution of 
special education disputes “in a timely manner through dispute medi-
ation and other methods.”73 
In 1997, Congress amended IDEA to require the States to offer 
mediation to the parties in a special education dispute.74 The 
amendment made mediation voluntary. 75 Mediation could not be used 
to delay or deny the right to a due process hearing.76 The mediation 
was to be confidential, and nothing that occurred in mediation could 
be used as evidence in a subsequent due process or court proceeding.77 
The mediation had to be conducted by a “qualified and impartial 
mediator trained in effective mediation techniques.”78 The cost of 
mediation was to be borne by the State.79 
In enacting these provisions, Congress stated its preference that 
special education disputes be resolved both quickly and amicably. The 
Report of the Senate’s Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
stated the “committee’s strong preference that mediation become the 
norm for resolving disputes under IDEA.”80 Mediation was seen as an 
attractive method to resolve disputes “amicably” and with “the child’s 
best interests in mind.”81 Another goal of the mediation option was to 
reduce the cost associated with due process.82 
 
disputes concerning the identification, evaluation, and educational 
placement of handicapped children, and the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to those children. Mediations have 
been conducted by members of State educational agencies or local 
educational agency personnel who were not previously involved in 
the particular case. In many cases, mediation leads to resolution of 
difference between parents and agencies without the development 
of an adversarial relationship and with minimal emotional stress. 
However, mediation may not be used to deny or delay a parent’s 
rights under [Subpart E of the EAHCA]. 
 42 Fed. Reg. 42474, 42495 (1977). 
73. Pub. Law 101–476 § 501, 104 Stat 1103, 1138 (1990). 
74. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. S. Rep. No. 105-17, at 26 (1997). 
81. Id. 
82. See S. Rep. No. 104-275, at 18 (1996) (outlining testimony supporting 
adding voluntary and impartial mediation procedures, in addition to the 
existing due process provisions, because of the significant financial and 
human resources due process requires). At the time, thirty-one States had 
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The 1997 Amendments strongly encouraged parents to use 
mediation as a means to resolve disputes. Any written notice to parents 
from a school district regarding proposed changes (or the refusal to 
make changes) with regard to special education services had to include 
information about the availability of mediation.83 If the parents declined 
to engage in mediation, either the school district or the state 
educational agency could establish procedures that would require the 
parents to meet with someone from a “community parent resource 
center” or similar entity who would “encourage the use, and explain the 
benefits, of the mediation process.”84 
At the time of the 1997 Amendments, Congress did hear testimony 
from those who advocated for mandatory mediation as a prerequisite 
to any due process proceedings.85 However, Congress did not go so far 
as to require mediation before a due process complaint could be filed. 
Following the 1997 Amendments, the Department of Education’s 
Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) began to fund a technical 
assistance center focused on exploring special education dispute 
resolution.86 The Center for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special 
Education (CADRE) is an invaluable resource for statistics and other 
 
already developed mediation processes to resolve special education 
disputes. Id. Congress also contemplated whether attorneys should be 
excluded from mediation proceedings, although Congress ultimately left 
that decision up to the States. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-614, at 16 (1996) 
(discussing attorney presence in mediation). 
83. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 90 (1997) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)). 
84. Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 615(e)(2)(B)(ii), 111 Stat. 90 (1997). This provision of 
IDEA was later described as “a section . . . that essentially allows a school to 
punish a parent who doesn’t want to go to mediation by forcing them to talk 
to somebody about all the wonders of mediation.” Special Education: Is IDEA 
Working as Congress Intended?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Government Reform, 107th Cong. 118–119 (2001) (statement of Kevin 
McDowell, general counsel, from the Indiana Department of Education). That 
requirement was characterized as both “punitive” and “off-putting.” Id. 
IDEA’s current provisions allow the local school district or state educational 
agency only to “offer” parents the opportunity to meet with someone who 
will explain the benefits of mediation. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(B) (2012). 
85. The IDEA Improvement Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 5 Before the 
Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the H. Comm. on 
Education and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 224 (1997), (statement of 
Lillian M. Brinkley on behalf of the National Association of Elementary 
School Privileges) (requesting statutory language that would “require 
mediation before court action could be initiated”). 
86. See 73 Fed. Reg. 44235, 44236 (July 30, 2008) (noting that OSEP has 
funded CADRE since 1998). 
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information about special education dispute resolution.87 CADRE has 
sponsored or authored a number of reports regarding the use of ADR 
mechanisms to resolve special education disputes.88 CADRE also has 
collected information about various state dispute resolution systems 
and has highlighted the systems in four states—Wisconsin, Iowa, 
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania—as “exemplary” systems.89 In CADRE’s 
view, the qualities of these exemplary systems are “high levels of 
stakeholder involvement, investment in early upstream dispute 
resolution processes, use of technical and content expertise, active 
participation in the CADRE Dispute Resolution Community of 
Practice, engagement in continuous quality improvement practices and 
thorough documentation of systems.”90 CADRE’s website provides 
detailed information about these systems.91 
D. The Current Due Process Provisions of IDEA 
Congress’s last amendments of IDEA took place in 2004. At that 
time, Congress found that parents and school districts needed 
“expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in positive and 
constructive ways.”92 To accomplish this goal, Congress added or 
expanded several ADR mechanisms. 
IDEA now requires the parties to attend a “resolution session” that 
must take place within fifteen days after a due process complaint is 
filed unless both parties agree to waive the session or to go to 
mediation.93 The legislative history indicates Congress’s intent that one 
of the main goals of the resolution session is to “improve communication 
 
87. Cadre: The Nat’l Ctr. on Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre [http://perma.cc/KFN7-GNWR] 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2015).  
88. See, e.g., Trends in Dispute Resolution Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Ctr. For Appropriate Dispute 
Resolution in Special Educ., (December 2013), http://www.direction 
service.org/cadre/pdf/TrendsDisputeResolutionIDEA_FEB15.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/KDE8-HCAC]. 
89. Exemplar State Profiles, Ctr. for Appropriate Dispute Resolution 
in Special Educ., http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/exem
plarprofiles.cfm [http://perma.cc/JML3-59ED] (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
90. Id. 
91. Ctr. for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., Four 
Exemplary Dispute Resolution Systems in Special Education (2010), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Combined%20State%20Profiles.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/J8RJ-9RC9]. 
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8) (2012). 
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(b); see also Mark C. Weber, Settling Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act Cases: Making Up is Hard to Do, 43 Loy. L.A. 
L. Rev. 641, 647–51 (2010) (describing the resolution session requirements). 
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between parents and school officials” when there is a dispute about 
services for a child with a disability.94 
Attendance at the resolution session is mandatory unless the session 
is waived.95 Unless the parent is represented by an attorney, attorneys 
may not be present for either side.96 Resolution sessions are not 
confidential and no impartial mediator or facilitator must be present.97 
If the parties reach an agreement during a resolution session, the parties 
“shall execute a legally binding agreement,”98 but either party can void 
the agreement within three business days after it has been signed.99 
In addition to the resolution session, the 2004 Amendments made 
mediation an option that the parties could use even before a due process 
complaint was filed.100 Both the resolution session and mediation extend 
the timeline for any administrative hearing to take place, thus delaying 
an adjudicated resolution of the dispute.101 
The 2004 Amendments were quite modest in terms of altering the 
structure of due process. Indeed, the amendments were exceedingly 
modest when one considers the variety of proposals put forth by 
legislators, scholars, and experts in the field in the early 2000s. 
Beginning in 2001, both the executive and the legislative branches 
undertook extensive reviews of special education due process. In 
October 2001, President George W. Bush created a Presidential Comm-
ission on Excellence in Special Education, which was assigned to review 
special education practices nationwide.102 In July 2002, the Commission 
published a report entitled A New Era: Revitalizing Special Education 
for Children and their Families.103 On the topic of dispute resolution, 
the Commission described numerous complaints from parents, teachers,  
94. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-77, at 114 (2003) (discussing communication 
between parents and local educational agencies). 
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2012). 
96. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(III). 
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B); Andrea Blau, Available Dispute Resolution 
Processes within the Reauthorized Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act (IDEIA) of 2004: Where Do Mediation Principles Fit In?, 
7 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 65, 71 (2007). 
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii). 
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iv). 
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). 
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(c)(3) (2012). 
102. Exec. Ord. No. 13227, 66 Fed. Reg. 51287 (Oct. 2, 2001). 
103. President’s Comm’n on Excellence in Special Educ., A New Era: 
Revitalizing Special Education for Children and their 
Families (2002), http://www.nectac.org/~pdfs/calls/2010/earlypartc/ 
revitalizing_special_education.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LKP-8BRF] 
[hereinafter A New Era]. 
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and school administrators about an “excessive focus on due process 
hearings and litigation over special education disputes.”104 The Comm-
ission concluded that IDEA dispute resolution warranted “serious 
reform.”105 
One of the Commission’s recommendations was to add voluntary 
binding arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.106 While the 
Commission’s report did not provide details regarding arbitration, it 
did quote the testimony of Professor S. James Rosenfeld, who testified 
that voluntary binding arbitration could be a “fair, impartial and fast” 
resolution of a special education dispute.107 In 2012, Professor Rosenfeld 
published an article in which he set forth a specific proposal for 
voluntary, binding arbitration, and that proposal is discussed in more 
detail below.108 
The Commission also recommended the use of early dispute 
resolution processes such as “expert IEP facilitation,”109 regarding that 
proposal. In the early 2000s, IEP facilitation was a relatively new 
dispute resolution process, and programs for IEP facilitation are 
discussed in more detail below.110 Both voluntary, binding arbitration 
and IEP facilitation were discussed in hearings before Congressional 
committees charged with amending IDEA.111 
In March 2003, a bill was introduced into the House of 
Representatives that would have amended the due process provisions 
in several substantive ways.112 First, H.R. 1350 would have required the 
States to design a procedure for the parties to voluntarily agree to  
104. Id. at 40. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 40–41. 
107. Id. at 41. 
108. See infra Part II.C.2.  
109. A New Era, supra note 103, at 40. 
110. See infra Part II.C.1. 
111. IDEA: What’s Good for Kids? What Works for Schools?: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 
65 (2002) (referring to “informal problem resolution” and “binding 
arbitration” as means to resolve disputes); IDEA: Focusing on Improvising 
Results for Children with Disabilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On 
Education Reform of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 108th 
Cong. 23 (2003) (discussing required mediation and binding arbitration); 
The President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education: Hearing 
before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th 
Cong. 23, 34 (2002) (discussing voluntary binding arbitration). 
112. See H.R. 1350, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced in the House); see also 
H.R. Rep. No. 108-77, at 113–14 (2003); 149 Cong. Rec. H3458-01, (Apr. 
30, 2003) (statement of John Boehner) (discussing voluntary binding 
arbitration as a means to resolve special education disputes). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Every Day Counts 
158 
arbitrate their dispute before a single “arbitrator.”113 Arbitration would 
have been an available dispute resolution option after a due process 
complaint had been filed. The decision of the arbitrator would have 
been a final resolution of the dispute “in lieu of a due process hearing” 
with no opportunity for further review or appeal.114 H.R. 1350 also 
mentioned the use of “individualized educational program facili-
tators,”115 although no details were given. 
Second, H.R. 1350 would have amended IDEA to eliminate the two-
tier due process structure.116 Specifically, H.R. 1350 provided that the 
party who filed a due process complaint would have the opportunity 
“for an impartial due process hearing, which [would] be conducted by 
the State educational agency,” with a right to appeal to state or federal 
court only after the state educational agency decision.117 
Also in March 2003, Senator Rick Santorum introduced a bill 
entitled the “Teacher Paperwork Reduction Act,” which would have 
required, among other things, mandatory mediation of special education 
disputes under IDEA.118 Senate Bill 626 set forth certain proposed 
findings of Congress, including the finding that among the causes of 
“burdensome paperwork”119 for special education teachers was “liti-
gation and the threat of litigation.”120 Another proposed finding was 
that mediation of special education disputes resolved disputes more 
quickly, cost less, and generally led to satisfactory results.121 The bill 
proposed to amend IDEA to make mediation a mandatory process in 
any special education dispute.122 
In the end, the 2004 Amendments did not include voluntary binding 
arbitration, IEP facilitation, or mandatory mediation. The Amend-
ments also did not eliminate the two-tier due process structure. The 
 
113. H.R. 1350 § 205(e). 
114. Id. The bill specified that arbitration decision would not be final in the 
event of fraud or misconduct. Id. 
115. H.R. 1350 § 672(b)(5). 
116. H.R. 1350 § 205(f) (proposing to amend 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A)). 
117. H.R. 1350 §§ 205(f), (g); see also H.R. Rep. No. 108-779, at 217 (2004) 
(Conf. Rep.) (noting that the House Bill “does not provide for a State-
level appeal system, so eliminates the dual-tier language”). 
118. S. 626, 108th Cong. (2003). A bill entitled the “IDEA Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 2003” was introduced into the House of Representatives in January 
2003, but that bill did not contain any provisions to amend the dispute 
resolution processes of IDEA. See H.R. 464, 108th Cong. (2003).  
119. S. 626, § 2(8). 
120. S. 626, § 2(8)(C). 
121. S. 626, § 2(9). 
122. S. 626, § 5. 
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only substantive changes were the addition of the resolution session123 
and allowing mediation to take place at any time.124 
II. The Debate Continues 
A. Current Criticisms of IDEA Due Process 
Even with the addition of the resolution session and expanded 
opportunities for mediation, advocates for both families and school 
districts contend that due process is still expensive, time consuming, 
and counterproductive to a collaborative parent-school relationship. 
These three points of contention have given rise to a number of 
additional proposals to “reform” special education due process.125 
The litigation cost is a point of contention on both sides of the 
table. School administrators assert that litigating a special education 
dispute is so expensive that school districts often agree to provide 
services that are not required by IDEA.126 These advocates also contend 
that when school districts provide unnecessary services to one child to 
avoid litigation costs, other children with disabilities suffer. The 
argument is that, because of limited school budgets, the children who 
receive unnecessary services as a result of school district capitulation 
take those services away from other children in need.127 
While this argument has a certain facial appeal, some scholars 
challenge the twin assumptions underlying this argument, specifically 
that parents who file a due process complaint always want expensive 
services and that special education funding is a “fixed pot of educational 
goods”128 such that a service provided to one child means less service 
for another child.129 Indeed, there are many inexpensive disputes that 
could give rise to a special education dispute, including a parent’s desire 
to have the child educated in a less restrictive, less expensive environ-
ment130 or a dispute about whether a child’s violation of the school code 
of conduct was a manifestation of the child’s disability.131 
 
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2012). 
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). 
125.  See infra Part II.C. 
126. Pudelski, supra note 11, at 2. 
127. Id. at 8. 
128. Weber, supra note 16, at 512. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. IDEA requires that, if necessary, a school district bear the cost of a child’s 
placement in a private school or residential facility. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 
(a)(10)(B) (2012). Some critics assume parents who file due process claims 
are seeking these expensive placements. See, e.g., Pudelski, supra note 
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Moreover, rather than dealing with a limited, inflexible budget, 
school districts have many ways of managing the costs of special 
education services, including litigation costs. School districts have the 
ability to purchase insurance for special education litigation at attract-
ive rates.132 School districts also can access state funding for special 
education services from state education agencies, many of whom have 
established state risk pools.133 In addition, most state funding mechan-
isms provide increased funding to districts based on a calculation of the 
level of service being provided to all children with disabilities in the 
district.134 
On the other side of the table, advocates for families contend that 
due process is too expensive for most parents because they cannot afford 
to pay the fees of attorneys and expert witnesses who are needed to 
litigate a special education dispute.135 Indeed, it is a focus of legislative 
action by parent-child advocacy groups that IDEA be amended to ease 
the recovery of attorneys’ fees and to allow the recovery of expert 
witness fees.136 
On this topic of cost, some scholars raise the very real concern that 
the current structure disproportionately favors wealthier parents whose 
income allows them to advocate for their child in a due process 
proceeding, when lower income parents are unable to bear the litigation  
11, at 8 n.19. In evaluating this argument, one should consider that as of 
2010, just 3.4% of the nation’s 6.4 million children receiving special 
education services were placed in the “expensive” settings such as a 
separate school for children with disabilities or a residential facility. See 
Thomas D. Snyder et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Digest of Edu-
cation Statistics 2012, at 89 tbl. 48 (2013), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs 
2014/2014015.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CG8-WJS6] [hereinafter Digest of 
Education Statistics 2012] (showing the number of children with 
disabilities receiving services under IDEA); Id. at 91 tbl. 50 (showing the 
placement of children receiving services under IDEA). In contrast, in 2010, 
nearly 81% of those 6.4 million children were placed in a general education 
classroom for 40–100% of their school day. Id. Over 60% of the children were 
in the general education classroom between 80–100% of the school day. Id. 
132. Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families under the IDEA: Collaborative 
in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. Nat’l. Ass’n. Admin. L. Judiciary 
423, 454–57 (2012). 
133. Weber, supra note 16, at 506. 
134. Id. 
135. See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 12, at 112–13 (discussing the high number 
of children receiving services under the IDEA whose families cannot afford 
attorneys’ fees associated with litigating due process hearings).  
136. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004, Council of 
Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Public Policy, http://www.cop
aa.org/?page=IDEA [http://perma.cc/MRM6-Q99J] (last visited Oct. 4, 
2015) (advocating for statutory amendments to provide for the payment of 
expert witness fees and attorneys’ fees in special education disputes). 
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costs and, therefore, cannot advocate for their child similarly.137 This 
inequality of access to due process becomes an even more acute problem 
when one considers that, statistically, children with disabilities are more 
likely to be a member of a lower-income family.138 
The other main criticism of the current due process system is that 
it is anticollaborative and poisons the school-parent relationship, 
ultimately to the detriment of the child.139 Unlike many other disputes, 
a special education dispute involves two parties who need to maintain 
a working relationship that will last as long as the child resides in the 
school district.140 In addition, each of the parties has a genuine interest 
in producing a good educational outcome for the child even as they 
might differ about the means to accomplish that goal. Given this 
dynamic, some argue that special education dispute resolution should 
take a form that is as removed from an adversarial litigation process as 
possible.141 
These criticisms of due process have led to widely varying proposals 
for change. There are essentially five main proposals, each of which is 
described below. Before describing these proposals, however, it is helpful 
to briefly consider issues that commonly give rise to a special education 
dispute. 
B. Common Issues in Special Education Disputes 
The first “decision point” in the process of receiving special edu-
cation services is a determination by the school district that a child 
meets IDEA’s definition of a “child with a disability.”142 IDEA defines 
a child with a disability as a child who fits into at least one of thirteen 
identified disability categories.143 In addition, the child’s disability must 
“adversely affect” the child’s educational performance such that the 
child needs special education services in order to access the educational 
curriculum.144 Thus, eligibility is one topic that could be the subject of 
a dispute. 
 
137. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 1430–33 (discussing wealth-based 
disparities in IDEA enforcement); Hyman, supra note 12, at 110–12 (outlining 
the disproportionate number of children eligible for special education services 
under IDEA living below the poverty line and without access to legal services). 
138. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 1432. 
139. Moses & Heeden, supra note 3, at 4. 
140. Id. 
141. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 551. 
142. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2012). 
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). 
144. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2007) (defining a “child with a disability”). 
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Once a child is deemed eligible for special education, the school 
district, together with the child’s parents, is required to prepare an indi-
vidualized educational program (IEP) for the child. The IEP document 
has been described as the “cornerstone” of the child’s right to an appro-
priate education.145 The IEP is a written document that contains very 
detailed provisions about the child’s levels of educational performance, 
statements of the projected goals and objectives for the child’s progress 
in the coming year, the means by which the child’s progress will be 
measured and reported to the parents, the level and type of services to 
be provided, and the educational setting, among other details.146 Given 
the IEP’s importance, it is not surprising that many disputes involve 
disagreements about the contents of a child’s IEP. 
The child’s educational placement—the setting or classroom where 
the child will receive services—also can be the subject of a dispute. 
IDEA provides that a child with a disability should receive services in 
the least restrictive environment that will allow the child to learn.147 
Special education is to be provided along a “continuum of alternative 
placements”148 that can range from placement in the general education 
classroom to placement in a private school or residential facility at 
public expense.149 Parents often have very strong views about whether 
their child should or should not be mainstreamed or included in the 
general education environment.150 For this reason, appropriate place-
ment is frequently a disputed matter. 
There are a myriad of other remaining issues that could be the 
subject of a dispute.151 A child with a disability who violates the school 
 
145. See, e.g., White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 378 
(5th Cir. 2003) (“The cornerstone of the IDEA is the IEP . . . .”); Tenn. Dep’t 
of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)) (“The development 
and implementation of the IEP are the cornerstones of the Act.”). 
146. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)–(4) (2012). 
147. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012). 
148. 34 C.F.R. 300.115 (2006). 
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (addressing placement of children in private 
schools by public agencies). 
150. Ruth A. Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years 
Later, 154 U. Penn. L. Rev. 789, 811–14 (2006) (describing circumstances 
where parents and school districts are likely to disagree about integration 
and placement). 
151. Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: The Need for a 
Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J. L. & 
Educ. 501 (2013) (arguing that due process hearings are not a fair 
mechanism for special education dispute resolution); see also Perry A. Zirkel 
& Cathy A. Skidmore, National Trends in Frequency and Outcome of 
Hearing and Review Officer Decisions under the IDEA: An Empirical 
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code of conduct may be subject to discipline, but only if the school 
determines that the child’s conduct was not a manifestation of the 
child’s disability.152 A parent may file due process to contest a disci-
plinary matter, arguing that the child’s conduct was a manifestation of 
the child’s disability. A parent also may file due process on the ground 
that the district failed to provide the services that had been agreed 
upon in the child’s IEP.153 A parent might file due process relating to 
the child’s entitlement to “extended school year” or summer services.154 
All of these varied potential areas for dispute are important to keep 
in mind when evaluating the proposals to modify the due process 
structure. 
C. Proposals to Reform Due Process 
1. IEP Facilitation 
In an effort to limit disputes that can arise during the IEP process, 
approximately twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have 
initiated programs known generally as IEP facilitation.155 IEP facilita- 
Analysis, 29 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 525, 543 (2014) (identifying 
different categories of issues to be resolved by due process hearing officers). 
152. See Cope-Kasten, supra note 151, at app. A (noting that in a review of 210 
due process hearings held from 2000-2011 in Wisconsin and Minnesota, 38% 
involved a dispute about evaluation, 6% involved a dispute about 
disciplinary issues, and 6% involved a dispute about teacher qualifications). 
153. See, e.g., Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 06-3866, 2008 WL 191176 
(E.D. Pa. 2008) (awarding compensatory education because the school district 
had failed to implement the IEP goals and objectives). Compensatory 
education has been described as the “poor man’s tuition reimbursement” 
because it is a form of relief that parents can request when the school district 
failed to provide the child with a FAPE either by implementing an inadequate 
IEP or by failing to provide the services that were agreed-upon in the IEP. 
Terry Jean Seligman and Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education for IDEA 
Violations: The Silly Putty of Remedies, 45 Urb. Law. 281, 295 (2013). 
154. 34 C.F.R. § 300.106 (2007). 
155. Process and Practice Information, Ctr. for Appropriate Dispute 
Resolution in Special Educ., http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/ 
processdefs14.cfm?thisid=12 [http://perma.cc/67JZ-GXKB] (last visited Oct. 
4, 2015) (identifying twenty-two states and the District of Columbia); Alaska 
Dep’t of Educ., Mediation, IEP Facilitation, Administrative 
Complain, and Due Process Hearing Request, https://education. 
alaska.gov/tls/sped/Mediation.html [https://perma.cc/NY5Y-BAM7]; 
Arkansas Dep’t of Educ., Mediation/IEP Facilitation, https://ark 
sped.k12.ar.us/DisputeResolution/Mediation.html [http://perma.cc/ALW3-
RH9E]; Arizona Dep’t of Educ., Special Education, http://www.azed. 
gov/special-education/dispute/fiep/ [http://perma.cc/CHR8-QUUT]; Conn-
ecticut State Dep’t of Educ., IEP Facilitation/Facilitators-
Updated (Jan. 21, 2014), http://ctspecialednews.org/2014/01/21/iep-
facilitation-facilitators/ [http://perma.cc/PCM2-Y4QH]; Oklahoma ABLE 
Tech, Special Education Resolution Center, http://www.ok.gov/ 
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tion is not required by IDEA. Rather, it is a voluntary process that the 
parties may use to resolve disputes about the contents of a child’s IEP. 
The dynamics of the IEP process are such that it is a common point 
at which disputes arise.156 It is the school district’s obligation to draft 
the IEP,157 and district employees obviously have a great deal of 
knowledge and experience since they draft IEPs for all eligible children 
in the district. In contrast, many parents are not experts in writing 
IEPs.158 Because it is the district’s obligation to draft the IEP and the 
parent’s obligation essentially to “read and approve,”159 a power im-
balance can result.160 The district’s employees naturally have an upper 
hand in asserting positions in an IEP meeting. In fact, some educators 
may resent parent input because of the educators’ belief that they are 
the experts in the field.161 
In addition, given IDEA’s requirements for attendance at IEP 
meetings, when the meeting is held, the child’s parent(s) will be in a 
room with several district employees.162 Parents can begin to feel 
outnumbered, resulting in reluctance to express their opinions freely.163 
Parents also often perceive that their opinions are discounted. Parents 
report that district employees often make patronizing comments about 
parents’ affection for their child, implying that the parent’s opinions 
 
abletech/Special_Education_Resolution_Center/ [http://perma.cc/XSN2-
C9TR]. See Blau, supra note 97, at 78–79. 
156. Chopp, supra note 132, at 432–38. 
157. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(4) (2012). 
158. Chopp, supra note 132, at 434. 
159. Id. 
160. Blau, supra note 97, at 79–80. 
161. Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special 
Education, 117 Yale L.J. 1802, 1831 (2008); see also Nancy Welsh, Stepping 
Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants 
about Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 573, 615–17 (2004) (noting the difficulties of determining what 
“meaningful participation” for parents on IEP teams amounts to). For a 
review of the literature detailing studies of parents’ perceptions of the IEP 
process, see Ctr. for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special 
Educ., Parents’ Experiences with the IEP Process: Considerations 
for Improving Practice (2010), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ 
pdf/Parent-IEP%20Process.pdf [http://perma.cc/MQE3-PZ7P]. 
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012) (describing the various school personnel 
who are part of a child’s IEP team). 
163. Chopp, supra note 132, at 432, 437. 
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stem from emotion rather than reasoned judgment about appropriate 
educational services for the child.164 
Given these dynamics and the importance of the IEP in ensuring 
that the child receives appropriate services, the idea developed that the 
presence of a neutral third party in an IEP meeting could help level the 
playing field between parents and school personnel.165 Facilitated IEP 
meetings occur when a neutral third-party assists in the organization 
and discussion of an IEP meeting with the goal of ensuring that the 
parties remain focused on future action, specifically the process of 
writing a document that will serve the best interests of the child.166 The 
parties can agree to use IEP facilitation at any point during the process 
of drafting a child’s IEP and, ideally, IEP facilitation will be used as 
soon as an “acrimonious climate” begins to develop.167 
The role of the IEP facilitator has been described as “focus[ing] on 
the dynamics of the meeting”168 to ensure that all attendees have an 
opportunity to fully express their views, listen respectfully to others, 
and direct their efforts to finding common ground as a means to resolve 
the matter.169 The facilitator is to “establish ground rules for the 
meeting, aid participants in developing clarifying questions which often 
lean to mutual solutions and require members of the team to adhere to 
timelines for completion of the meeting.”170 The IEP facilitator is not 
present to offer opinions about the strengths or weaknesses of a partic-
 
164. Id. at 433 (“[P]arents are seen by school districts as lacking emotional 
distance . . . .”). 
165. Blau, supra note 97, at 78–79 (describing IEP facilitation generally). 
166. See Mueller, supra note 13, at 65 (discussing how to conduct an IEP facilitation 
meeting). It has been reported that some school district personnel are 
uncomfortable with IEP facilitation because they perceive themselves as more 
experienced in writing IEP and question the facilitator’s knowledge or expertise 
in the area. Kelly Henderson, Nat’l Assoc. of State Dirs. Of Special 
Educ., Optional IDEA Alternative Dispute Resolution 13 (2008), 
http://nasdse.org/DesktopModules/DNNspot-Store/ProductFiles/28_ 
40952f55-7269-45cf-bd7a-729008ad403d.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LEA-DF5S]. 
167. Edward Feinberg et al., Consortium for Appropriate Dispute 
Resolution in Special Educ., Beyond Mediation: Strategies for 
Appropriate Early Dispute Resolution in Special Education 23 
(2002), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Beyond%20Mediation.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/EX8V-GVAG]. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Mueller, supra note 13, at 64 (citing Edward Feinberg et al., Consortium 
for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., Beyond 
Mediation: Strategies for Appropriate Early Dispute Resolution 
in Special Education 23 (2002), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ 
pdf/Beyond%20Mediation.pdf [http://perma.cc/EX8V-GVAG]). 
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ular party’s position or to otherwise negotiate the terms of the IEP 
document.171 
The use of IEP facilitation has expanded rapidly in the last ten 
years. In 2005, IEP facilitation programs existed in just eight states.172 
Today, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have IEP 
facilitation programs.173 
CADRE has been an early and strong supporter of IEP 
Facilitation.174 CADRE’s website contains a great deal of information  
171. Id.  
172. Moses & Heeden, supra note 3, at 7. 
173. Id.; see also Process and Practice Information, Ctr. for Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution in Special Educ.,, http://www.directionservice.org/ 
cadre/ctu/processdefs14.cfm?thisid=12 [http://perma.cc/3ZD5-3RJ5] (last 
visited Sep. 11, 2015) (information on CADRE’s website about IEP 
facilitation programs in various states). Those states are Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
While there is no statewide program, some local school districts within 
Kansas offer IEP facilitation. See, e.g., Olathe Public Schools, 
Special Services, Olathe Special Services Site Council 2013–
2014 (Mar. 2013), http://schools.olatheschools.com/buildings/north/files/ 
2012/06/Special-Service-English.pdf [http://perma.cc/JG5G-554R]. 
In addition, several other states have either had IEP facilitation programs in 
the past or are contemplating an IEP facilitation program. Indiana had an 
IEP facilitation project, but funding has ended. Ctr. for Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., Co-Facilitation IEP Meeting 
Project - Indiana, http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/practicesA. 
cfm?id=61 [http://perma.cc/SV8Z-XR36] (last visited Sep. 11, 2015). In June 
2014, the New York State Education Department posted a request for 
applications to participate in an IEP Facilitation pilot program scheduled to 
begin in 2015. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, Special Educ., Request for 
Applications – Individualized Education Program (IEP) Facilitators,  
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/applications/IEPfacilitatorrequest.htm
[http://perma.cc/3KUF-WWMR] (last updated June 9, 2014). In 2012, the 
Georgia State Advisory Panel for Special Education apparently explored the 
idea of having facilitated IEP meetings and tentatively planned to implement 
a full program by 2015. Ga. Dep’t of Educ., Minutes Summary: State 
Advisory Panel Meeting (April 26-27, 2012). Florida officials apparently also 
have discussed IEP facilitation. Fla. Dep’t of Educ., Meeting Report: State 
Advisory Committee for the Education of Exceptional Students (Aug. 5-6, 
2013). Missouri is considering IEP facilitation. Mo. Dep’t of Elementary 
and Secondary Educ., Minutes: Special Education Advisory Panel Meeting 
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/se-seap-special- 
education-advisory-panel-minutes3-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/GX92-BQD5]. 
174. Moses & Heeden, supra note 3, at 6; Feinberg, supra note 167, at 23; Ctr. 
for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., Facilitated 
IEP Meetings: An Emerging Practice (2004), http://www.direction 
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about IEP facilitation, including results of surveys completed by parties 
who had participated in IEP facilitation.175 These surveys indicate a 
high level of satisfaction with the process.176 
2. Public Enforcement of IDEA 
As stated above, some scholars criticize the due process structure 
as a system that, due to its reliance on parents as the child’s advocate, 
disproportionately favors wealthier and more educated families who 
have the means to pursue due process.177 To counteract this inequality, 
these scholars recommend several steps to enhance public enforcement 
of IDEA’s requirements.178 One step is a proposal to increase the 
government’s collection and publication of data relating to special 
education, with the belief that additional public information may 
reduce “information asymmetries”179 that are thought to benefit 
wealthier families in the “informational game.”180 Examples of data that 
the government might collect and publish would be more detailed data 
 
service.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitated%20IEP%20for%20CADRE%20English.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q5NY-39M3]. 
175. Ctr. for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., Post 
IEP Facilitation Facilitator Survey Results 2007–2008, (2008), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/artifacts/WI-20%20 
Post%20IEP%20Facilitators%20Survey%20NOV08.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
9DUW-EPMY]. 
176. See, e.g., Dep’t of Pub. Instruction Exceptional Children Div., 
Special Education Facilitation Program July 1, 2008–June 30, 
2009, http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/NC08-09FacilitationE
ndYearReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/R8CG-5D3W] (providing results of a 
survey conducted in Wisconsin). 
177. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 1416–17; Hyman, supra note 12, at 112–13; 
Alex Hurder, Left Behind with No “IDEA”: Children with Disabilities 
Without Means, 34 B.C. J. L. & Soc. Just. 283, 284 (2014). Indeed, soon 
after the passage of EAHCA, there were some concerns expressed that the 
system of private enforcement might be insufficient. Enforcing the Right to 
an “Appropriate” Education: the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1103 (1979). 
178. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 1461–88; Hyman, supra note 12, at 150–55, 159–
62. These scholars also propose a number of other legislative changes, 
including providing easier recovery of attorneys’ fees by parents, explicitly 
authorizing recovery of expert witness fees, requiring the school district to 
bear the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with IDEA’s 
requirements, and amending the statutory language regarding procedural 
inadequacies as a basis for prevailing in a due process matter, among other 
changes. Id. at 146–50 (discussing attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and the 
burden of proof); Hurder, supra note 177, at 306–09 (discussing attorneys’ 
fees and expert witness fees, as well as relief for procedural violations). 
179. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 1437–40. 
180. Id. at 1438. 
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regarding the special education classification and placement of children 
disaggregated by income or socioeconomic status.181 
A more ambitious suggestion is to have the government create a 
database of IEPs that would be cross-referenced with the child’s, that 
is family’s, income.182 One suggested benefit of such a database is that 
it would allow parents without financial resources to obtain information 
about the type of services received by children of wealthier families.183 
Another suggested benefit of this database is that districts might, with 
the benefit of the data, be “nudged” to avoid making class-based 
differences in their treatment of children in the district.184 The 
recognized impediments to the creation of such a database are the cost 
involved and the risk that a child’s personally identifiable information 
might be included in the data.185 
Another proposal is to have state educational agencies engage in 
random audits or investigations of districts to assess the quality of IEPs 
for low-income children.186 The state investigators could either assess 
the quality of IEPs in isolation, “without making any comparisons to 
other IEPs,” or compare the IEPs of “low-income and high-income 
students in the same district” to determine disparities in treatment and 
the overall quality of IEPs written for low-income students.187 If the 
state found disparities in services or placement that were not “edu-
cationally justified,” then the state could order that the IEPs for those 
students be re-written and that the district make “systemic changes” 
to reduce the possibility that disparities would continue to exist.188 
A third proposal is to have federal agencies be more aggressive in 
investigating and, when appropriate, enforcing IDEA’s requirements in 
litigation.189 
A fourth proposal is for Congress to provide funds to states that 
would take steps to ensure that “poor children are provided with 
services as good as those provided to wealthier children.”190 This 
proposal seeks to offer financial incentives to states that voluntarily 
examine the relationship between family wealth and special education 
 
181. Id. at 1145–46. 
182. Id. at 1467–68. 
183. Id. at 1468. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 1470–72. 
186. Id. at 1473–74. 
187. Id. at 1473. 
188. Id. at 1475 
189. Hyman, supra note 12, at 159–60. 
190. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 1486. 
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services and, when inequalities are found, institute reforms to any 
disparities that are attributable to family income.191 
A final proposal in the realm of “public enforcement” is to increase 
the availability of pro bono attorneys, law school clinics, and 
community advocates to help low-income families understand and 
access the existing due process system.192 This includes one proposal 
that is modeled after a public defender system, in which each child is 
assigned a special advocate—not necessarily an attorney—as soon as 
the child is identified as a child who might be in need of special 
education services.193 
3. Voluntary, Binding Arbitration 
Since the 2004 Amendments to IDEA, discussion of the use of 
voluntary, binding arbitration has continued.194 Some scholars contend 
that Congress “wisely eschewed” the arbitration model because of the 
lack of good evidence that arbitration would be less costly or faster than 
an administrative hearing.195 Others argue that, given the costs and 
delay associated with “over-legalization” of due process hearings, special 
education disputes should be resolved through an arbitration process 
using “a single-session hearing without judicial appeal,” except in 
limited circumstances involving “major new legal issues.”196 
In 2012, Professor S. James Rosenfeld published an article on the 
topic.197 Professor Rosenfeld contends that arbitration would improve 
IDEA’s due process structure by providing both “a more balanced 
‘access to justice’ and swift and final decisions.”198 One advantage of 
voluntary, binding arbitration would be “eliminating the need for 
attorneys”199 in order to decrease the “adversarial atmosphere” of due 
process.200 Another potential benefit would be “a much shorter timeline 
 
191. Id. at 1486–87. 
192. Ruth A. Colker, Disabled Education 244–45 (2013); Hurder, supra 
note 177, at 306–07; Hyman, supra note 12, at 158–59. 
193. Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special 
Education, 117 Yale L.J. 1802, 1847–48 (2008). 
194. See Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 554–56 (discussing the policy justifications 
behind final and binding arbitration). 
195. Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities 
Improvement Act, 58 Fla. L. Rev. 7, 52 (2006). 
196. Perry A. Zirkel, Commentary, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 
195 Educ. L. Rep. 35, 38 (2005). 
197. Rosenfeld, supra note 13. 
198. Id. at 545. 
199. Id. at 551. 
200. Id. 
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for decision and implementation.”201 A third benefit is described as an 
increased “focus . . . on the student’s educational program” as a result 
of a less adversarial proceeding.202 Finally, a fourth identified benefit is 
that the arbitration panel, if composed as described below, would have 
“greater expertise” in both the legal and teaching/educational issues 
than the mediators or due process hearing officers who currently hear 
special education matters.203 
Professor Rosenfeld describes his proposal as a “snapshot”204 of a 
proposed arbitration system rather than a specific proposal, which he 
states would be further developed with the input of a variety of stake-
holders in the process.205 With that caveat, Professor Rosenfeld proposes 
that arbitration would involve a three-person panel consisting of an 
expert in the child’s primary disability, an expert in the field of special 
education (administration or provision of services), and an attorney 
familiar with special education laws.206 The parties may opt for binding 
arbitration only after giving “fully informed and completely voluntary” 
consent, which would have to include an explicit understanding that 
the parties are foregoing any right to appeal the panel’s decision.207 
Professor Rosenfeld also proposes that no attorneys can be present 
in the proceeding unless the parent also either has an attorney or 
consents to the presence of the school district’s attorney.208 The panel 
would have “complete discretion” to determine both the rules under 
which the proceeding would be conducted and “the nature and scope of 
the evidence (witnesses or documents) it will seek or hear.”209 Indeed, 
it would be the responsibility of the panel to “assume a controlling role 
in the process,” including calling expert witnesses, questioning other 
witnesses, seeking evaluations of the child, or reformulating the issues 
before the panel.210 The record of the proceeding would be confidential 
 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 547. 
205. Id. at 552 (“None of this is meant to be exhaustive; to the contrary, it is 
set forth in the hope and expectation that others can and will identify 
oversights and made additional suggestions.”). 
206. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 561–63. 
207. Id. at 552. 
208. Id. at 554. 
209. Id. This part of the proposal implies that parents would lose rights 
currently available under IDEA, including the rights to “present evidence 
and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.”  
20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(2) (2012). 
210. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 560–61. 
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and “substantive challenges to the decision” would be heard only by 
the panel.211 
To accomplish the goal of providing a quick resolution of the 
dispute, Professor Rosenfeld proposes that the panel be required to issue 
its decision within “thirty school days”212 from the assignment of the 
matter to the arbitration panel unless, due to unusual circumstances, 
the parties agree to an extension of time at the beginning of the proceed-
ings.213 Professor Rosenfeld further proposes that the decision should be 
written as a “quasi-IEP” with a description of goals, programs, and 
services to be provided.214 To ensure compliance with the terms of the 
arbitration decision, Professor Rosenfeld proposes that the state edu-
cational agency be given authority to enforce the terms of the decision 
and that the state education agency be required to “assure compliance” 
within fifteen days after receiving a complaint, presumably filed by the 
parent, that the decision is not being implemented properly.215 
Professor Rosenfeld does not propose that arbitration replace the 
current due process structure, only that it be added to IDEA as another 
dispute resolution system that the parties can choose to access.216 
4. A Radical Overhaul of Special Education Due Process 
In July 2013, the American Association of School Administrators 
(AASA) published a report proposing “critical changes”217 to special 
education due process.218 The AASA contends that, for a number of 
reasons, the current due process system is not working well. In addition 
to the criticisms noted above, specifically that due process costs too 
much,219 unfairly disadvantages lower-income families, and “breeds  
211. Id. at 556. 
212. Id. at 556–57. This timeline is essentially the same as the forty-five day 
period for resolving a due process matter that had been required by IDEA 
before Congress added the thirty-day resolution session period in 2004. 
See supra, note 2. Thirty school days equals forty-two calendar days (five 
school days in a week times six weeks). 
213. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 557. 
214. Id. at 557–58. 
215. Id. at 558. 
216. Id. at 566. 
217. Pudelski, supra note 11, at 2. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 13. The AASA cites a survey it conducted of 200 school superintendents 
across the country, in which the survey respondents indicated that school 
districts may budget between $12,000 and $50,000 per year to address 
potential costs associated with due process or litigation. Id. National data on 
annual school budgets indicates that, on average, $50,000 is a modest sum for 
most school districts in the nation. In the 2009–2010 school year, there were 
13,625 “regular” school districts in the United States with total revenues of 
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hostility”220 between parents and school officials, the AASA sets forth 
several additional reasons why the current due process structure is 
either obsolete or ineffective. 
The AASA first contends that the current due process structure 
has become obsolete due to changes in federal education legislation, 
particularly the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act221 (NCLB) and the 2004 
amendments to IDEA. AASA cites the data reporting requirements of 
NCLB and IDEA as “wield[ing] significant pressure on districts”222 such 
that due process “no longer serves as a powerful compliance lever.”223 
The AASA also implies that the current structure is unnecessary 
because children with disabilities no longer need robust due process 
protections that they might have needed in the past, stating that “[t]he 
inclusion of people with disabilities in all walks of life is now a given.”224 
This proposition is belied by current events demonstrating that children 
with disabilities are often the subject of bullying and hatred,225 
sometimes even at the hands of school employees.226  
$597 billion. Digest of Education Statistics 2012, supra note 131, at 146 
tbl. 100 (showing the number of public elementary and secondary education 
agencies); Id. at 315 tbl. 203 (showing the revenue for public elementary and 
secondary schools). Thus, the average school budget was $43.8 million dollars. 
Using that figure, $50,000 is 0.00114% of the average school budget. 12,000 
dollars is 0.00027% of the average school budget. 
The AASA did acknowledge that districts can purchase insurance to cover 
the litigation costs of special education due process. Pudelski, supra note 
10, at 14 (citing annual premiums between $2,500 and $10,000). 
220. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 9. 
221. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). 
222. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 7. 
223. Id. at 9. The AASA proposal contends that district compliance is driven 
by the potential for adverse consequences under federal law, including loss 
of federal funding, “intensive state monitoring,” or state-level imposed 
mandated improvement activities. Id. at 7. 
224. Id. at 16. 
225. See, e.g., Trudi Bird & Joe Kemp, Family of 13-year-old Autistic Boy Disgusted 
After Hate-Filled Letter is Slipped Under Their Door Urging Them to 
‘Euthanize’ Boy for Being a Neighborhood ‘Nuisance,’ N.Y. 
Daily News (Aug. 20, 2013, 7:42 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
world/disgusting-father-hate-filled-letter-euthanize-autistic-son-nuisance- 
article-1.1431505 [http://perma.cc/Y3AG-J3XH] (discussing a letter sent to 
the family of an autistic Canadian teenager); Prosecutors Mull Charges 
Against Teen Accused in Prank ‘Ice Bucket Challenge’ on Autistic Boy, 
Huffington Post (Sept. 17, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2014/09/17/ice-bucket-prank-autism-_n_5834882.html 
[http://perma.cc/44BH-3THY] (discussing a prank in which teenagers 
dumped a mixture of urine and tobacco on an autistic teenager). 
226. See, e.g., Koehler v. Juaniata Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:07-CV-0117, 2008 WL 
1787632 (M.D. Pa., April 17, 2008) (finding that teachers placed a non-
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Another cited reason for overhauling the current structure is the 
lack of data demonstrating that success in a due process hearing leads 
to a better educational outcome for the student.227 This is an argument 
in the negative; the lack of any data, positive or negative, leads the 
AASA to conclude that the system does not work.228 
In addition, reciting several anecdotal stories, the AASA asserts 
that due process adversely affects teacher retention in the field of special 
education.229 In fact, the retention of special education teachers is 
subject to a myriad of factors, including salary consideration, school 
climate, and administrative support, among others.230 Although 
“paperwork” has been identified as one cause leading to special edu-
cation teacher attrition, neither due process nor litigation is specifically 
cited as a reason why a special education teacher might leave the field.231 
What does the AASA propose? The AASA describes its proposal 
as “two-pronged approach” designed to make it “more difficult for 
litigation to occur.”232 Indeed, the AASA acknowledges an overall goal 
to “creat[e] a ‘lawyer-free system’ [in which] costs for districts will be 
significantly reduced.”233 
 
verbal autistic child in a thermally insulated, camouflage jumpsuit, sealed 
the jumpsuit with duct tape, raised the temperature in the room, and locked 
the child in the room alone; also finding that the parent, on behalf of the 
child, could pursue claims under both federal and state law against the 
school district and individual employees); Olympia Bus Driver Accused of 
Bullying Disabled Girl, KOMONews.com (Apr. 23, 2014, 7:03 AM), 
http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Olympia-school-bus-driver-accused- 
of-bullying-girl-256352061.html [http://perma.cc/W8YA-EQDX] (discussing 
a bus driver who allegedly encouraged verbal abuse of a developmentally 
disabled girl).  
227. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 7. 
228. Id. at 21 (criticizing the lack of any follow-up after a due process decision 
to determine whether the outcome of due process “positively or negatively 
affected student performance”). Professor Mark Weber notes that the data 
demanded by AASA would be very difficult to obtain, noting that “a 
researcher would be hard put to design a controlled experiment that would 
be consistent with ethical practices that would test that hypothesis.” 
Weber, supra note 16, at 511. 
229. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 12–13. 
230. See Bonnie S. Billingsley, Ctr. On Personnel Studies in Special 
Educ., Special Education Teacher Retention and Attrition: A 
Critical Analysis of the Literature 37 (2003), http://copsse.education. 
ufl.edu/docs/RS-2/1/RS-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/GYJ7-CHNY] (describing 
the factors that lead to attrition for special education teacher). 
231. Id. at 23. 
232. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 17. 
233. Id. at 22. 
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The AASA proposal requires the parties to engage in IEP 
facilitation with a state-provided, trained facilitator before any form of 
due process or litigation could be pursued.234 No lawyers or advocates 
may be present in the IEP facilitation meeting.235 The AASA proposal 
does not describe procedures to be used if the special education dispute 
did not involve an issue relating to a child’s IEP. 
If IEP facilitation fails to resolve the dispute, then the parties must 
engage in mediation.236 Again, no lawyers may be present, and, for some 
reason, no legally binding agreement may be created.237 
If mediation fails, the AASA proposal would then require the joint 
selection of an “independent, neutral special education consultant desig-
nated by the state to . . . advise the parties on how to devise a suitable 
compromise IEP.”238 The consultant, once notified of the request for his 
or her services, would have fifteen days to hold an initial meeting with 
the parties.239 Following that meeting, the consultant would have an 
additional twenty-one240 days to make observations, review records, and 
write an IEP.241 The parties then “would be obligated to follow the 
consultant-designed IEP for a mutually agreed upon period of time”242 
that is not specified. Again, this is a step in the process where lawyers 
would not be involved.243 
If, after all of the procedures described above—IEP facilitation, 
voluntary mediation, implementation of a consultant-written IEP—
have been satisfied, any party who wishes to pursue the matter further 
may file a “lawsuit in federal court.”244 Thus, the AASA proposal would 
“abolish[] the [due process] hearing system”245 entirely.246 
 
234. Id. at 18. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 19. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 4, 20. 
239. Id. at 20. 
240. The AASA proposal in one section refers to a twenty-one day period, Id. 
at 20, but, in another section, refers to a thirty-day period. Id. at 21 n.70. 
241. Id. at 20. 
242. Id. at 4. 
243. Id. at 22 (describing the consultancy system as a “lawyer-free system” 
that would “level the playing field between low-income families and 
districts in IDEA disputes”). 
244. Id. at 20. 
245. Id. at 21. 
246. Id. at 23 (noting that the proposal would “replac[e] the due process system”). 
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Scholars, advocacy groups, and practitioners have recognized the 
AASA’s proposal as an attempt to weaken the procedural protections 
IDEA currently grants to children and their parents.247 Indeed, al-
though the AASA report cited Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal for 
voluntary, binding arbitration with approval, Professor Rosenfeld 
himself has disavowed any association with the AASA proposal.248 
5. Defending the Current Structure 
The fifth main proposal to modify the special education due process 
is actually labelled as a “defense” of due process.249 In a recent article, 
Professor Mark Weber contends that the criticisms of the system are 
“badly overblown”250 and that the system generally is cost-effective and 
yields good results for parents, particularly when compared to litigation 
outcomes in other contexts.251 He proposes that, with only “a few  
247.  See Weber, supra note 16; Yael Cannon et al., A Solution Hiding in Plain 
Sight: Special Education and Better Outcomes for Children with Social, 
Emotional and Behavioral Challenges, 41 Fordham Urban L.J. 403, 490–
91 (2013) (“[W]e should not allow [the law’s] shortcomings to be a convenient 
refuge for those who would seek to . . . attempt to weaken its 
protections . . . .”); AASA Document Nothing More Than A Shameful Attack 
on Parent and Student Civil Rights, Council of Parent Attorneys and 
Advocates: News and Press: Policy (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.copaa. 
org/news/121292/AASA-Document-Nothing-More-Than-A-Shameful-
Attack-on-Parent-and-Student-Civil-Rights-.html [http://perma.cc/QQ25-
BCJE] (“AASA’s proposals are irresponsible, uninformed, in violation of the 
IDEA, and clearly designed to meet an agenda of denying the Civil Rights 
and educational needs of students with disabilities.”); Gregory R. Branch, 
Orange County Special Education Attorney Opposes AASA Proposal, The 
Law Office of Gregory R. Branch: Blog (Apr. 28, 2013, 10:37 PM), 
http://www.ocspecialedattorney.com/orange-county-special-education-
attorney-opposes-aasa-proposal/ [http://perma.cc/S254-GGNW] (describing 
the AASA proposal as “unfairly tilting the balance of power” in favor of school 
districts, which would be represented by a “highly-trained district office 
administrator, many of whom hold doctorate degrees in education or more 
specifically special education”); see also Mary Richard, AASA, the Emperor’s 
New Clothes, Special Education Mediations and Due Process Hearings, 
Special Educ. L. in Iowa (Apr. 20, 2013), http://specialeducationlawmmr. 
blogspot.com/2013/04/aasa-emperors-new-clothes-special.html [http://perma. 
cc/XT48-UGJK] (“[T]he AASA’s proposals demonstrate . . . the kind of 
overreaching on the part of public school agencies that Congress anticipated 
when it enacted the portions of the IDEA which afford procedural protections 
to the parents of children with disabilities). 
248. S. James Rosenfeld, Director’s Statement on AASA Report on Due 
Process, IDEA ALJ/HO Academy, Seattle U. Sch. of L. (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.law.seattleu.edu/continuing-legal-education/ 
upcoming-programs/idea-aljho-academy [http://perma.cc/CG8T-KJSL]. 
249. Weber, supra note 16. 
250. Id. at 495. 
251. Id. at 508–10. 
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modest reforms,” the current structure would meet the parties’ expect-
ations and fulfill IDEA’s goals.252 
Professor Weber acknowledges that income inequality affects 
parents’ abilities to pursue due process but notes that such inequality 
exists throughout our legal and economic systems.253 He argues that in-
come inequality is not a reason to radically overhaul the system, noting 
that there is a “ripple effect of successful due process proceedings”254 
under which litigation funded by higher income families has some 
benefit to other children in the system by creating good law, leading to 
statutory amendments and the like.255 He also notes that due process 
decisions awarding tuition reimbursement to wealthier parents for pri-
vate placements can lead school districts to improve or create programs 
within the public school system that benefit additional children.256 
As noted above, Professor Weber also takes issue with the notion 
that successful due process pursued by wealthier families leaves other 
children with fewer services.257 Among the reasons he gives are that 
often parents may not be asking for more expensive services (citing the 
example where parents want a child to be educated in the least 
restrictive environment) and the fact that states often allocate more 
money to districts that serve students with greater needs.258 
Professor Weber also challenges the belief that due process 
structure is too costly for school districts.259 He cites a 2003 study by 
the Government Accounting Office, which found that the number of 
formal special education disputes was relatively low, and a 2013 
CADRE report indicating that due process hearing requests and 
hearings have been declining.260 
Indeed, statistics contained within the AASA’s own proposal 
support Professor Weber’s opinion. The AASA’s survey of school  
252. Id. at 495. 
253. Id. at 503 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 
Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95 (1974)). 
254. Id. at 505. 
255. Id. at 505–06. 
256. Id.; see also Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 
14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 171, 182 (2005) (“[O]utspoken parents may 
serve the interests of all children in the school district and, by informational 
spillover, of the nation. In this light, the distribution of resources among 
children with disabilities may not be a zero-sum game. . . . The advocacy work 
of some parents may pay dividends for everyone; it raises the standards of 
appropriate special education and augments the rights of all children.”). 
257. See supra Part II.A. 
258. Weber, supra note 16, at 505–07. 
259. Id. at 508–09. 
260. Id. 
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administrators indicates that the number of disputes is low.261 More 
than one-half (51%) of the school superintendents who responded to the 
AASA survey had not “been involved in special education litigation or 
due process in the past five years.”262 Ninety percent of the survey 
respondents had had fewer than five due process hearings in the last 
five years.263 
Professor Weber proposes that due process could be improved with 
“modest procedural changes”264 designed to streamline the due process 
proceedings and, in some cases, strengthen parents’ positions in due 
process.265 He proposes (a) amending IDEA to allow parents who prevail 
in due process to recover expert witness fees; (b) relaxing the rules 
about exhaustion of administrative proceedings; (c) streamlining due 
process proceedings by, among other things, minimizing pre-hearing 
motion practice; (d) enhancing the training of impartial hearing officers; 
and (e) clarifying the means to enforce a settlement reached in a special 
education dispute.266 
III. The Survey 
In 2014, I decided to survey special education attorneys regarding 
the current due process structure and facets of some of the proposals 
described above. The idea to conduct a survey came from anecdotal 
conversations with special education attorneys in Ohio about due 
process.267 These attorneys opined that the resolution session usually 
was a waste of the parties’ time. They also expressed the view that the  
261. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
262. Id. at 10. 
263. Id. at 9–10. The AASA report reports that just seven percent of districts 
had six to ten due process hearings within the last five years and three 
percent of districts had eleven or more hearings over the same period. Id. 
264. Weber, supra note 16, at 519. 
265. Id. at 520, 522. 
266. Id. at 520–23. 
267. I teach a course in Special Education law, and during the semester, I 
invite area attorneys who practice special education law to come and 
speak with my class. For several years, my students and I have been lucky 
enough to have two highly experienced attorneys come to share their 
views. Kerry Agins is a well respected attorney in the Cleveland area who 
represents parents and their children in special education disputes. About 
Kerry Agins, Esq., The Law Offices of Agins and Gilman LLC, 
http://www.siegelaginsandgilman.com/About-Kerry-Agins.html [http:// 
perma.cc/7Y25-ZCNL] (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). Kathryn Perrico is 
another excellent special education attorney whose clients are school districts 
and personnel. Kathryn Perrico, Smith Peters Kalail Co., L.P.A. 
Attorneys at Law, http://www.ohioedlaw.com/kathryn-i-perrico 
[http://perma.cc/C267-EP9L] (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
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hearing officer system in Ohio was deficient in many respects, a view 
that Professor Ruth Colker outlined in a recent article.268 These conver-
sations piqued my interest in ascertaining what practitioners thought 
about the current structure and proposals to change the structure. 
Once I decided to create a survey, I considered the topics that might 
be covered. I was very interested in obtaining practitioners’ views about 
the effectiveness of the resolution session and in hearing practitioners’ 
views about IEP facilitation. Finally, I wanted to get feedback on both 
the voluntary, binding arbitration model and aspects of the AASA 
proposal. 
I also added a topic that has not received a great deal of in-depth 
attention in the scholarship, namely the relative benefits or costs of a 
one-tier due process structure as opposed to a two-tier due process 
structure.269 Again, it was my Ohio-based focus that caused me to be 
interested in this topic. Ohio is one of just eight states with a two-tier 
structure.270 
For two reasons, I omitted any questions about the use of mediation 
to settle special education disputes. First, the use of mediation as a 
means to resolve special education disputes is so widely accepted that 
any further amendments to IDEA likely would not address mediation.271 
Second, given all of the other topics to be covered and a concern that 
the survey would become excessively long, I decided to omit mediation 
as a topic. 
My target audience was attorneys who are actively engaged in the 
practice of special education law.272 I did not quantify the target 
 
268. Colker, supra note 69. 
269. Id. at 406. 
270. Zirkel & Scala, supra note 62, at 7. The survey also asked a number of 
questions about quality and training of hearing officers; however, that 
topic will be the subject of a later article. 
271. See, e.g., Feinberg et al., supra note 167, at 8 (indicating high levels of 
satisfaction with the use of mediation to resolve special education disputes). 
272. There are special education “lay advocates” who assist parents in seeking 
special education services but may not handle due process matters or 
litigation. For information about the use of lay advocates, see Eileen M. 
Ahern, The Involvement of Lay Advocates in Due Process Hearings, The 
Nat’l Ctr. on Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., (Oct. 2001), 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/The_Involv4449.cfm [http://perma. 
cc/A96W-6FSU]; see also Kay Hennessy Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the 
Matter of Arons: Construction of the IDEA’s Lay Advocate Provision Too 
Narrow, 9 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 193, 212–214 (2002) (discussing 
the value of lay advocates in the field of special education). I recognize that 
lay advocates can provide invaluable services to parents. However, because 
lay advocates may include individuals who do not handle due process or 
otherwise make strategic legal decisions in a dispute, I sought to limit their 
involvement in the survey by asking the survey respondents whether they 
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population of special education attorneys nationwide. Rather, I att-
empted to reach as many special education attorneys as I could through 
a variety of efforts. 
First, I contacted nonprofit organizations, including the Education 
Law Association,273 The National School Boards Association,274 and the 
Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates.275 I asked those organiza-
tions to distribute the survey to their members, and they agreed to do 
so, for which I thank them.276 Second, I contacted individual attorneys 
whose names and email addresses I obtained by searching websites with 
lists of special education practitioners.277 Third, I searched on the Inter-
net to find attorneys who advertised their expertise in special education 
law.278 I also reviewed the publicly available special education due 
process decisions to find the names and contact information for counsel 
who had represented parties in due process hearings.279 
 
were “an attorney with an active practice in Education Law” and filtering 
responses based on the answer. 
273. Educ. Law Ass’n, https://www.educationlaw.org [https://perma.cc/J7QE- 
3K29] (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
274. Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n, www.nsba.org [http://perma.cc/Z8AG-WFNG] 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
275. Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, www.copaa.org 
[http://perma.cc/8T94-XESP] (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
276. Emails from Cate Smith, Executive Director of ELA, Sonja Trainor, 
Director, Council of School Attorneys of NASB, and Denise Marshall, 
Executive Director of COPAA are on file with the author. 
277. See, e.g., Wrightslaw Yellow Pages for Kids, http://www.yellowpages 
forkids.com [http://perma.cc/TRJ3-2RLD] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); 
Autism Speaks, http://www.autismspeaks.org/resource-guide/by-state/
81/Attorneys/OH [http://perma.cc/9PWQ-LGPR] (last visited Sept. 30, 
2015); The Quaker School at Horsham, http://www.quakerschool. 
org/resources/special-education-attorneys [http://perma.cc/KR66-3S7Q] 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015); Advocates for Special Educ., http:// 
advocatesforspecialeducation.com/index.html [http://perma.cc/QJX6-AVTL] 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015); Minnesota School Boards Association, 
http://www.mnmsba.org/Resources/COSA [http://perma.cc/C2RA-
CW7Q] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
278. See, e.g., Littman Krooks LLP, http://www.specialneedsnewyork. 
com/attorneys [http://perma.cc/R3CT-WFW3] (last visited Sept. 30, 
2015); Special Needs Law Firm of Jeffrey A. Gottlieb, Esq., 
http://www.specialeducationattorneyatlaw.com [http://perma.cc/2NPD- 
TA4Z] (last visited Sept. 17, 2015); Law Offices of Marc Grossman, 
http://www.wefight4you.com/california-attorneys/hans-gillinger [http:// 
perma.cc/7ZRK-667Z] (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
279. See, e.g., Ga. Dep’t of Educ., http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-
Instruction-and-Assessment/Special-Education-Services/Pages/Due-
Process-Hearing-Decisions-.aspx [http://perma.cc/H2LB-B2JS] (last visited  
Sept. 30, 2015); EdResourcesOhio.org, http://www.edresourcesohio. 
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The survey was anonymous, voluntary, and completed online.280 
Survey respondents were able to exit the survey at any time. The survey 
was designed to obtain both quantitative and qualitative information 
through the use of both Likert-type questions and open-ended questions 
with space for the respondents to provide narrative answers. 
Responses were collected between June 23, 2014 and November 18, 
2014. Three hundred ninety-three individuals completed the survey.281 
Of that number, 355 respondents had an active practice in education 
law. One hundred sixty-six respondents indicated that he or she had an 
active practice representing school districts, boards of education or 
school personnel, of which ninety-four of those individuals (57%) 
indicated that 100% of their clients were school-related personnel or 
entities.282 Two hundred forty-three respondents indicated that his or 
her clients were parents and/or children seeking rights under IDEA; 
one hundred sixteen of those attorneys (48%) indicated that 100% of 
the clients were parents and children.283 
A. IEP Facilitation 
The survey first asked whether the respondents had any experience 
with IEP facilitation. One hundred seventeen (70.5%) of the school 
district attorneys indicated that they had experience with IEP facili-
tation. One hundred forty of the parent-child attorneys indicated that 
they had experience with IEP facilitation.284 
Broken into those subgroups, the school district attorneys were 
more positive about the use of IEP facilitation as a means to resolve  
org/due-process-decisions [http://perma.cc/MK9W-9TYX (last visited Sept. 
30, 2015)]. In some states, the attorney-identifying information is redacted. 
280. The survey was designed using Qualtrics software licensed to the University 
of Akron. The survey was exempt from IRB review by the University of 
Akron’s Institutional Review Board. A letter to that effect is on file with 
the author. The survey questions also are on file with the author. 
281. Five hundred eighty-one individuals began the survey, yielding a dropout 
rate of thirty-two percent. I solicited responses from practitioners in the 
fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia. 
282. Ninety-four respondents (57%) indicated that 100% of clients were school-
related personnel or entities. Fifty-seven respondents (34%) indicated that 
76–99% of clients were school-related personnel or entities, and another 
fifteen respondents (9%) indicated that between 51–75% of clients were 
school-related personnel or entities. 
283. One hundred sixteen respondents (48%) indicated that 100% of clients 
were parents/children. Ninety-six respondents (40%) indicated that 76–
99% of clients were parents/children, and another thirty-one respondents 
(13%) indicated that between 51–75% of clients were parents/children. 
284. The term “school district attorney” refers to survey respondents who 
represent school districts or school personnel. The term “parent-child 
attorney” refers to survey respondents who represent parents and children. 
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disputes. When asked whether IEP facilitation was a “valuable vehicle 
to resolve disagreements quickly,” and provided with a Likert-type 
scale,285 twelve school district attorneys (11%) strongly agreed with that 
proposition and fifty-two (49%) agreed with the proposition.286 Twelve 
school district attorneys (11%) disagreed with the proposition, and four 
(4%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
Of the parent-child attorneys who responded to the same question, 
just five (4%) strongly agreed with the proposition, while thirty-three 
individuals (29%) agreed with the proposition. Thirty-three parent-
child attorneys (29%) disagreed with the proposition, and another ten 
(9%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
Twenty-six school district attorneys (25%) and thirty-four parent-
child attorneys (30%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition, 
taking essentially a neutral stance on the value of IEP facilitation. 
The use of IEP facilitation as a means to avoid due process received 
mixed results. When asked if IEP facilitation “often resolves disagree-
ments, thereby avoiding the filing of a due process complaint,” just 
seven school district attorneys (7%) strongly agreed. Thirty-eight 
school district attorneys (37%) agreed with the proposition. Thirty 
school district attorneys (29%) neither agreed nor disagreed, twenty-six 
school district attorneys (25%) disagreed with the proposition, and 
three school district attorneys (3%) strongly disagreed with the 
proposition. 
The parent-child attorneys were more negative about the use of 
IEP facilitation as a means to resolve disagreements and avoid the filing 
of a due process complaint. Just five parent-child attorneys (4%) 
strongly agreed with the proposition. Of the remaining parent-child 
attorneys, twenty-six (23%) agreed with the proposition; twenty-four 
(21%) neither agreed nor disagreed, forty-eight (43%) disagreed, and 
nine (8%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
The narrative comments provided by the survey respondents were 
most revealing about their views. Overall, the respondents indicated 
that IEP facilitation—in concept—could be an effective means to 
resolve disputes, as noted by the following comments: 
 I think it is an excellent way to resolve disputes. Unfortunately, it is 
not always enough to resolve the parties[’]differences, but when it is, it 
saves the District money and generally results in a better program for 
the students. Also, it fosters relationship building, rather than breaking 
relationships down. 
 
285. The survey gave five possible responses: strongly disagree, disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree. 
286. Because the survey respondents were allowed to skip questions in the survey, 
the number of respondents changes slightly from question to question. 
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 IEP facilitation is an excellent way to keep the IEP process on track 
in terms of coverage of topics, management of time and management 
of conflicting personalities. 
 IEP facilitation provides a means for parents and school officials to 
retain some control over educational issues on a local basis, which is 
where the decisions should be made. It is much less costly than due 
process hearing litigation and less arbitrary than the agency complaint 
process. 
 It is particularly useful for those cases where there have been 
multiple IEP team meetings and personalities have stood in the way 
in terms of meaningful discussion. 
However, attorneys on both sides of the table agreed that the 
success of IEP facilitation was highly dependent on the facilitator’s skill 
and training. One parent-child attorney noted: “The idea is a good one 
and has the potential to work[,] but it is entirely dependent on the 
individual characteristics of the facilitator.” A school district attorney 
similarly stated: “I strongly believe that IEP facilitation is valuable if 
the facilitator is trained using a practical, usable approach and knows 
IDEA requirements well.”287 
Yet respondents seemed to agree that training of IEP facilitators is 
currently a barrier to effective use of the procedure. One survey 
respondent stated: “I do not believe that IEP facilitation is being 
conducted by highly qualified individuals. The facilitators have not 
been effective in resolving contentious matters. Their function appeared 
to be nothing more than conducting the meeting.” Another comment 
was: “I have never encountered any facilitator who has specific training 
and experience in facilitating IEP meetings. They are ‘borrowed’ from 
other disciplines in the hope that their presence will somehow add value 
to the process. Usually they are superfluous to the process.” One 
individual succinctly stated: “Facilitators need far more training to 
make the experience valuable.”288 
Interestingly, there were a few comments from attorneys on both 
sides of the table indicating that the facilitators demonstrated bias 
towards one party or the other. A school district attorney stated: “I do 
not discourage my clients from agreeing to IEP facilitation. However, 
the majority of reports I receive after the fact is that the facilitator 
 
287. Another similar comment was: “I think that the facilitation process is 
theoretically desirable, but a huge amount depends on the neutrality, knowledge 
and skill of the facilitator, as well as the sophistication of the parents.” 
288. A more barbed comment from a school district attorney was: “The facilitators 
I have worked with are spectacularly ill-informed about the law and about 
special education generally. They frequently suggest “compromises” that will 
address parental concerns but that do not appropriately serve the child or 
that totally ignore IDEA requirements like RTI, LRE and the like.” 
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spent most of the meeting trying to convince the District to provide 
what the family was [sic] requested. My clients often feel that the 
process is one-sided.” A parent-child attorney stated: “Unfortunately, 
the facilitators I have worked with are often biased, favoring the schools 
and school districts. Parents sense that bias and then doubt the 
opinions of the facilitator.” 
In addition, both school district attorneys and parent-child 
attorneys recognized that IEP facilitation could not resolve all disputes, 
in particular those disputes where the parties have clearly comm-
unicated their positions and simply disagree as to the appropriate 
course of action for the child. Representative comments included: 
 I only find IEP facilitation helpful when Districts and Parents are 
having trouble communicating, but not when there is a substantive 
issue regarding the appropriateness of placement or services. 
 I believe it is a valuable means to solve disputes arising out of 
miscommunication. I have not found it is a helpful means to resolve 
disputes arising out of disagreement with assessment results[,] current 
levels of performance and best practice with service delivery[,] times[,] 
amounts and different types of providers. 
 It can be beneficial, but when parents are lawyered up following 
unilateral placement and the only issues remaining are a monetary 
demand, there is no need for attention to an IEP; it’s all about money. 
 Facilitation is a tool to assist parties to find common ground and 
reach agreement. When one party approaches the IEP meeting with a 
fixed goal / outcome and is unable / unwilling to consider alternatives, 
facili[t]ation may help to highlight the differences but not facilitate a 
resolution. 
The survey also asked if IEP facilitation should be mandated under 
IDEA as a prerequisite that must be satisfied before a due process 
complaint can be filed. An overwhelming majority of the parent-child 
attorneys (88%) answered “No.”289 A majority of the school district 
attorneys (57%) also answered “No.”290 
When asked to explain their answers, those survey respondents who 
favored mandatory IEP facilitation generally focused on the cost of due 
process. For example, one survey respondent stated: “[D]ue process is 
very expensive[,] and the parties should be forced through several 
different procedures prior to going to ‘court.’” Another point in favor 
of mandatory IEP facilitation was that the mandatory meeting would 
make clear to all parties that a dispute is on the horizon. In particular, 
 
289. Among parent-child attorneys, 4% had no opinion and 7% answered “Yes.” 
290. 6% of school district attorneys had no opinion and 38% answered “Yes.” 
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one school district attorney commented: “Too many times, due process 
hearings are filed without any attempts to engage the school district in 
meaningful communication about the pending issues. This results in 
fractured feelings between the school personnel and the family.” 
Those respondents not in favor of mandating IEP facilitation 
focused on two main issues. First, many respondents commented on the 
low probability of success in mandating a meeting in which the focus is 
collaboration: “It should never be required. If the parties do no[t] wish 
to do it on their own, it will not be successful.” Another similar com-
ment was: “The fact that this is a voluntary process aid[]s the parties 
in reaching resolution because they already have to be predisposed to 
it. Forcing the facilitation where the parties are not willing to resolve 
their differences will likely prove futile and frustrating and delay the 
process of getting to hearing and reaching resolution.”291 
The second main issue was the burden that would result by adding 
another layer to the process. One school district attorney stated: “There 
are already resolution meetings or mediation requirements. No need to 
add a redundant layer of [alternative dispute resolution].” A parent-
child attorney similarly commented: “It would require an additional 
procedural step that might delay the parents’ right to a speedy hear-
ing.”292 Yet another survey respondent stated: “Resolution sessions are 
already fruitless in 98% of cases. Adding another layer will not help at 
all.”293 
B. Voluntary Binding Arbitration 
The survey next asked whether the respondent would support a 
procedure for voluntary, binding arbitration of special education 
disputes.294 Again, the response was largely negative. One hundred 
thirty-nine parent-child attorneys (67%) answered “No.” Seventy-seven 
 
291. A parent-child attorney stated: “There are too many variables that can result 
in a poor relationship between parents and school district personnel—on both 
sides. I have seen situations where forcing a facilitated IEP meeting would only 
serve to increase the trauma for the parents and further polarize the parties.” 
292. Another similar comment was: “At times litigation is necessary and 
mandating facilitation could be used as a delay tactic by school.” 
293. A school district attorney noted: “A resolution session is already mandatory. 
Unless there is to be absolutely stellar training for facilitators, it should not 
be required.” 
294. The question read: “Should IDEA include voluntary, binding arbitration 
as a dispute resolution mechanism? Assume that the arbitration panel 
would consist of a (non-lawyer) expert in the child’s suspected disability, 
a special educator with experience administering IDEA’s provisions, and a 
lawyer familiar with special education law, including dispute resolution. 
Also assume that the arbitration decision would be binding with no right 
of appeal. Both parties would have to agree to arbitration. The costs 
would be borne by the state.” 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Every Day Counts 
185 
school district attorneys (55%) also answered “No.” Forty-seven parent-
child attorneys (23%) attorneys answered ‘Yes,” and forty-six school 
district attorneys (33%) answered “Yes.” The remainder of both groups 
had no opinion.295 
The survey allowed the respondents to choose among a series of 
reasons why voluntary, binding arbitration might, or might not be, a 
valuable ADR mechanism. One hundred forty-five parent-child 
attorneys (73%) cited the lack of an appeal right as a reason not to 
support voluntary, binding arbitration; the lack of an appeal right was 
cited by sixty-two school district attorneys (48%) as a potential reason 
not to support voluntary, binding arbitration. Sixty-eight school district 
attorneys (53%) indicated that, so long as arbitration was an option 
that the parties could choose voluntarily, it could be included in IDEA. 
Seventy parent-child attorneys (35%) also agreed with that proposition. 
C. The Resolution Session 
The survey also asked about the respondents’ experiences with the 
resolution session. When asked whether the resolution session was a 
valuable vehicle to resolve special education disputes quickly, attorneys 
on both sides of the table essentially said “No.” Just eight school district 
attorneys (6%) strongly agreed with the proposition; another forty-five 
school district attorneys (35%) agreed with the proposition. Over one-
third of school district attorneys either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the proposition, while nearly one-quarter of the school district 
attorneys essentially took no position.296 
The parent-child attorneys were even more negative about the use 
of the resolution session as a means to resolve disputes. Just five parent-
child attorneys (3%) strongly agreed that the resolution session was a 
valuable vehicle to resolve disputes quickly. Another twenty-eight 
individuals (15%) agreed with the proposition. However, over sixty 
percent of the parent-child attorneys disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the proposition, while the remainder had no opinion.297 
When asked whether, based on experience, the respondents had 
“substantial success” in resolving special education disputes at the 
resolution session, the survey respondents generally answered in the 
negative. One-half of the school district attorneys indicated that, in 
 
295. Twenty parent-child attorneys (10%) had no opinion, while eighteen 
school district attorneys (13%) had no opinion. 
296. Twenty-eight school district attorneys (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the proposition. Thirty-two school district attorneys (25%) disagreed with the 
proposition, and sixteen others (12%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
297. Forty parent-child attorneys (21%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
proposition. Fifty-eight parent-child attorneys (30%) disagreed with the 
proposition and another sixty individuals (31%) strongly disagreed with 
the proposition. 
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their experience, the resolution session had not resulted in substantial 
success.298 Two-thirds of the parent-child attorneys indicated that the 
resolution session had not been substantially successful in resolving 
disputes.299 
The results were very similar in response to a question whether the 
parties “most often” do not resolve a special education dispute at the 
resolution session. Again, over one-half of the school district attorneys 
indicated that, in their experience, the parties did not often resolve a 
special education dispute during the resolution session.300 Nearly three-
quarters of the parent-child attorneys indicated that, in their exper-
iences, the resolution session often did not resolve a special education 
dispute.301 
The narrative comments of the survey respondents were telling. 
One school district attorney stated: “Many school districts do not agree 
to [resolution sessions] because they see it as an unproductive step 
which only incurs extra costs for them.” Another school district 
attorney stated: “It’s a waste of time. We almost always waive the 
resolution session and proceed directly to mediation. The presence of a 
mediator usually goes a long way toward helping the parties reach an 
agreement.” Similarly, a parent-child attorney stated: “Resolution 
sessions are ineffective because most often it consists of the same 
individuals arguing over the same issues they couldn’t resolve at an IEP 
 
298. The question was a Likert-type question that asked the respondents to 
agree with the proposition. Just four school district attorneys (3%) 
strongly agreed with the proposition. Twenty-seven individuals (21%) 
agreed with the proposition, and another thirty-three individuals (26%) 
neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition. Forty-four school 
district attorneys (35%) disagreed with the proposition, and an additional 
nineteen individuals (15%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
299. Four parent-child attorneys (2%) strongly agreed with the proposition. 
Twenty-five individuals (13%) agreed with the proposition, and another 
thirty-five individuals (18%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
proposition. Forty-six parent-child attorneys (24%) disagreed with the 
proposition, and an additional eighty parent-child attorneys (42%) 
strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
300. Eighteen school district attorneys (14%) strongly agreed with the 
proposition. Forty-nine individuals (38%) agreed with the proposition, 
and another twenty-eight individuals (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed 
with the proposition. Twenty-nine school district attorneys (23%) 
disagreed with the proposition, and an additional four school district 
attorneys (3%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
301. Seventy-six parent-child attorneys (40%) strongly agreed with the proposition. 
Sixty-two individuals (33%) agreed with the proposition, and another twenty-
eight individuals (15%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition. 
Twenty parent-child attorneys (11%) disagreed with the proposition, and just 
four individuals (2%) strongly disagreed with the proposition. 
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meeting. There is no one new involved in the process. It just un-
necessarily delays resolution [of] the matter.” 
Parent-child attorneys expressed concerns that school districts use 
the resolution session to gain “free discovery” about the other side’s 
case in advance of a due process hearing. One parent-child attorney 
stated: “The resolution session/period simply causes delays. School 
District[]s do not use it to resolve matters, but instead use it as a means 
of intimidating the parent, delaying the proceedings, and/or a form of 
discovery in preparation for the hearing.” This use of the resolution 
session as a litigation strategy by school district was reflected in several 
comments of parent-child attorneys. For example, one individual 
stated: “In my view, the resolution session never focuses on resolution 
of the parents’ claims, but instead focuses on the district’s attempt to 
take discovery and to strengthen its litigation position.”302 
And at least one school district attorney approached this issue with 
a slightly different focus, stating: “From a school attorney’s perspective, 
voluntary mediation tends to be far more effective if used in that both 
parties seem to take comfort in and benefit from the facilitation of a 
neutral third-party. If the parties couldn’t work out their issues at an 
IEP meeting or otherwise, sitting together again at a resolution session 
is usually not helpful to resolve the case. It can, however, be useful in 
creating a record of what a district tried to do to resolve a case since 
the documentation is admissible at a due process hearing (unlike 
mediation documentation).” 
Several survey respondents also noted that the resolution session is 
poorly placed in the dispute resolution system to be effective. One 
survey respondent stated: “As to an actual resolution session conducted 
by the school district, I find them to be lar[]gely unhelpful because there 
is no neutral party to help rebuild the trust and open the lines of 
communication between the parties, they have low rates of success in 
my experience, and simply unnecessarily delay the due process case.” A 
school district attorney noted: 
Although it has been effective, that is rare. Typically, it takes 
formal mediation for true resolution to occur. The resolution 
session is usually a rehashing of the issues included in the due 
process hearing request. I think it also occurs too early--if the 
parents filed for due process, then they are still really angry and 
ready to litigate, and the school is very defensive at having been 
sued. After a little time passes and litigation becomes more 
 
302. Another parent-child attorney similarly commented: “Resolution sessions 
are used by school districts to repeat their last offer, try to bully parents, 
and try to obtain early discovery of whatever information parent[s] might 
have to use against them when they don’t settle the case.” 
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involved and time-consuming, the parties are usually ready to 
resolve it and be done the whole process.303 
Finally, another concern was the complicating factor about 
payment of attorneys’ fees for represented parents. One school district 
attorney stated: “Often, in the district I represent, the parent’s 
attorneys refuse to allow them to attend resolution for fear they will 
settle without addressing attorney’s fees.” A parent-child attorney 
stated: “It’s just another meeting with the same parties to the disagree-
ment. Unlikely to resolve anything and you can’t get attorney fees.” 
D. One-Tier v. Two-Tier Structure 
The survey then inquired about the one-tier and two-tier due 
process structures. Seventy-seven survey respondents indicated that 
they had experience litigating in a jurisdiction with a two-tier system.304 
Of those seventy-seven respondents, forty-six (60%) indicated that they 
would prefer a one-tier structure over a two-tier structure. Nine 
respondents (12%) had no opinion, and twenty-two (29%) indicated 
that they preferred the two-tier structure.305 
Using Likert-type questions, the survey posited reasons why a two-
tier administrative structure might or might not be advantageous. The 
survey asked whether a two-tier structure was preferable because the 
second level of review would issue a decision faster than if the case were 
directly appealed to state or federal court. Just one respondent (2%) 
strongly agreed with that proposition. An additional thirteen respon-
dents (20%) agreed with the proposition; however, nearly two-thirds of 
 
303. Echoing similar thoughts, one parent-child attorney commented: “I think that 
the resolution session is generally a waste of time for parents, is confusing for 
them, because the school does little of significance to change their position, 
and the school uses it as free discovery and to maneuver the parent into a 
weaker position. As there is no outside actor, e.g., a mediator, I don’t think 
there is anything about the resolution session that could not be resolved by 
the district in direct discussions with the parents at an IEP meeting.” 
304. Those jurisdictions are: Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma and South Carolina. North Carolina has a 
“modified one-tier” system in which both administrative levels are 
conducted by the State. See O.M. ex rel. McWhirter v. Orange Cnty. 
(N.C.) Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09CV692, 2013 WL 664900, at *11 (M.D.N.C., 
Feb. 23, 2013), report and recommendation adopted sub nom, O.M. ex 
rel. McWhirter v. Orange Cnty. (N.C.) Bd. Of Educ., No. 1:09-CV-692, 
2013 WL 1212880 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2013). 
305. Because only seventy-seven individuals indicated that they had experience 
with a two-tier structure, I did not divide the total into subgroups by 
client representation. 
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the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the prop-
osition.306 
The survey also asked the respondents whether the second level of 
review decreased the likelihood that a party would file suit in federal or 
state court. The purpose of the question was to determine the 
practitioners’ opinions whether a two-tier structure reduced court 
filings. Not a single survey respondent strongly agreed with this prop-
osition. Nineteen respondents (29%) agreed with the proposition. 
Twenty-six individuals (40%) disagreed with the proposition that the 
second level of review would decrease appeals to state or federal court, 
and eight individuals (12%) strongly disagreed with the proposition.307 
Thus, just over one-half of the survey respondents indicated that, in 
their opinion, the second level of review does not decrease further 
appeals to state or federal court. 
The survey then asked the respondents whether the second level of 
review increased the overall costs of IDEA due process. Seventeen 
survey respondents (27%) strongly agreed with this proposition, and an 
additional twenty-three respondents (37%) agreed with the proposition. 
Just eleven survey respondents (17%) disagreed with the proposition, 
and three respondents (5%) strongly disagreed with the proposition.308 
In the comments, respondents who supported a two-tier structure 
indicated that one advantage of a two-tier structure was the oppor-
tunity to correct errors made at the hearing officer level quickly and 
inexpensively. For example, one survey respondent noted: “The 
impartial hearing officer does not always apply the law. The two-tier 
process allows for a review of the legal issues involved.” Another 
individual commented: “State-level review corrects the often hasty and 
overworked hearing officers, whose decisions run the gamut in terms of 
how bad they can be.” Yet another opinion was that “[t]he second tier 
really is an appeal but is much less expensive. It gives clarity to the 
issues and has helped avoid costly appeals in court.” 
Those survey respondents who would rather litigate in a one-tier 
structure essentially cited three interrelated reasons to prefer a one-tier 
structure: efficiency, expense, and time. Several survey respondents 
concisely stated “speed and simplicity,” “less expense for clients,” or 
“[f]aster resolutions” as their reasons for preferring a one-tier structure. 
Other comments included: “[T]wo tier systems require much more 
 
306. Nine respondents (14%) had no opinion. Twenty-three respondents (35%) 
disagreed with the proposition, and nineteen respondents (29%) strongly 
disagreed with the proposition. 
307. Twelve individuals (18%) had no opinion. 
308. Nine individuals (14%) had no opinion. 
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manpower, thus a one tier is more efficient for the [state education 
agency] and the families.”309 
In addition, several comments reflected the survey respondents’ 
strong belief that for those disputes in which a due process hearing is 
held, the case is not over until it had been heard in federal court. Several 
respondents made reference to federal court as the final decision maker, 
stating, for example: “If the result is unsatisfactory, we would prefer 
getting that appeal into the Courts.” Another comment was: “No reason 
for 2 tier! Get through administrative process and go straight to court 
where we want to be anyway!” Still a third comment was: “I worked in 
a state with a one-tier structure and felt like it was helpful. If the 
parents are intent on getting to court for their attorney fees no matter 
what, it gets it done more quickly.” And a fourth comment: “The first 
truly neutral forum in special ed is federal court, and the sooner parties 
get there the quicker disputes will be resol[v]ed.” 
Some survey respondents also stated a belief that the second level 
of review was “political” or that the second level of review was 
unnecessary because the second level was simply a “rubber stamp” of 
the hearing officer’s decision.310 
Three hundred four survey respondents indicated that they had 
experience litigating in a one-tier structure. One hundred eighty-six 
respondents (61%) indicated that they preferred the one-tier structure. 
Eighty-eight respondents (29%) had no opinion, and just twenty-nine 
respondents (10%) indicated a preference for a two-tier structure. 
As with those survey respondents with experience litigating in a 
two-tier structure, the reasons for a particular preference were 
essentially the same. Those who preferred a two-tier structure cited the 
ability to get a quicker review of the first-level decision. One such 
comment was: “The two-tier structure provided a faster review of the 
decision and, in my opinion, resulted in fewer federal court appeals. 
 
309. Comments included the following: (a) “A second tier is inefficient, and costly, 
and results in additional delays;” (b) “[t]he process is slow and burdensome;” 
and (c) “[l]ess costly. The second tier is often a ‘rubber stamp’ of the first 
level and creates a barrier to parents getting into court in a timely manner.” 
310. For example, one respondent stated: “In Nevada the second tier has been a 
waste of time. A rubber stamp of the decision.” Another similar comment 
was: “The SLRO level in Ohio is not[h]ing more than a rubber stamping of 
the IHO level. Also, if Ohio were a one-tier system with costs borne by the 
state, filings would likely decrease and/or settlement would increase.” 
 The issue of bias or politics was a recurring theme from practitioners with 
experience in New York. One representative comment was: “It reduces the 
machinations of political manipulation. Here in NYC the Department often 
appeals (Albany SRO) and the IHO decision often is reversed, those parents 
that proceed to federal court often result in the IHO decision being re-instated 
at either the District / appellate Circuit level. The politics in NYS (Albany) 
are ‘intricate’ to say the least. A one tier system in NYS would remove a layer 
of manipulation (political) often to the detriment of the handicapped child.” 
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Now, it seems that every due process decision is re-litigated in federal 
court, which often takes years.” Similarly, those respondents who pre-
ferred a one-tier structure cited issues of cost and delay. One individual 
stated: “Efficiency, as it permits the court to directly review the 
findings and conclusions of the IHO.” Another comment was: “Two tier 
is too lengthy and expensive; [I] would rather head to court directly.” 
Of particular interest were the comments from survey respondents 
who had experience in a state that had moved from a two-tier to a one-
tier system. Examples of such comments included: 
 I have litigated under BOTH systems as Arizona used to be a two 
tier process. The two tier process simply adds another layer for district 
attorneys to bill or for parents to be burdened. I find that the hearing 
officer’s decisions in Arizona are very thorough and only one has ever 
been appealed by the district. When we used a two tier system, the 
decisions were not as thorough and many more were appealed. 
 We had a two-tier system in Illinois until 1997 and it was often 
utilized, thus prolonging the litigation and final outcome of a case. 
 Disputes are resolved more quickly, and I believe that parents have 
a better chance of prevailing in a face to face hearing than on a cold 
record. (I practice in Pennsylvania, which used to have a 2-tier 
system.) 
 Pennsylvania was previously a two-tier jurisdiction which provided 
inconsistent decisions among the appellate panels and costing parents 
more resources to litigate the issue. 
 Virginia used to have a two tiered system and changed to a one tier. 
I prefer the one tier as we can get to court more quickly if we do not 
settle. When we had a 2-tier system, final resolution was delayed. 
In addition, there were multiple comments that indicated that 
disputes almost invariably include an appeal to federal court. One 
respondent stated: “It’s often better to get the matter to court so that 
we can get a resolution.” Another similar comment was: “Being able to 
go right to federal court gets us swifter and fairer relief in our cases.”311 
Other comments reflected the opinion that federal court was the pre-
ferred venue because of the quality of decision making. One respondent 
preferred federal court “[b]ecause better decisions are often rendered at 
the federal court level.” Yet another survey respondent stated:  
 
311. Another similar comment was: “Because I believe justice is better served 
when the parties litigate through the administrative process and then 
resort to the courts instead of belaboring the process to the point where 
it is so expensive and time-consuming that each side is exhausted before 
an article 3 judge ever gets to see the case.” 
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The federal court can review the decision of the hearing officer 
who actually heard the case, assessed credibility, considered the 
factual and legal claims, and then issued the final decision and 
not another adjudicator who simply reviewed the transcripts and 
exhibits. A second tier system contributes to unnecessary delays. 
I do not think a second tier adjudicator is better qualified to 
determine whether a hearing officer was correct or not. 
Another similar comment was:  
We have a full opportunity to establish a record and present 
arguments at the administrative hearing. I see no reason to in-
clude an additional forum before appeals may be made to court. 
I do not support any dispute resolution session that delays 
decisions for children in special education matters. 
Reducing delay appeared to be the prominent reason for certain 
survey respondents to prefer a one-tier system.  
IV. Recommendations 
This Part sets forth a series of recommendations with regard to the 
structure of IDEA due process. These recommendations do not address 
proposals for change within the existing structure, although I do 
support several of these intrasystem changes.312 The following recomm-
endations, however, focus on the structure—the meetings, hearings, or 
procedures that do, or should, take place in a special education dispute. 
A. Offer IEP Facilitation, But Do Not Mandate Its Use 
Based on a review of the literature and the survey results, IEP 
facilitation appears to be an effective ADR mechanism, particularly if 
the parties quickly recognize the need for a neutral third-party’s 
involvement early in the process.313 As a form of ADR that occurs 
“upstream,” before either party has filed a due process complaint, IEP 
facilitation is particularly helpful in resolving disputes at an early 
stage.314 For this reason, any amendments to IDEA should require every 
 
312. In particular, I support Professor Weber’s proposal to ease the exhaustion 
requirement and the call for additional low-cost or pro bono legal services 
for low-income parents seeking special education services for their 
children. See supra Parts II.C.2. and II.C.5. 
313. See Henderson, supra note 166, at 9–10. 
314. Erin R. Archerd et al., The Ohio State University Dispute Resolution in 
Special Education Symposium Panel, 30 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 
89, 94 (2014); Ctr. for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special 
Educ., Four Exemplary Dispute Resolution Systems in Special  
Education 2 (June 2010), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/ 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Every Day Counts 
193 
state to develop a program of IEP facilitation. Since twenty-nine states 
currently have such a program in place, with several other states 
beginning to consider or develop programs,315 it seems worthwhile to 
“nationalize” the practice. Indeed, it is worth noting that four of the 
most active jurisdictions for special education due process filings—
California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York—do not have a 
statewide program of IEP facilitation.316 
If Congress does add a requirement that IEP facilitation be 
available in all states, Congress also should provide the states with 
minimum requirements for IEP facilitation programs. Guidance is 
necessary to avoid the “considerable variability” among the states that 
exists both with regard to the mechanics of IEP facilitation and “those 
who serve as facilitators.”317 
First, the federal government should develop guidelines for training 
IEP facilitators. While a facilitator should neither judge the parties’ 
various proposals nor draft an IEP, to effectively facilitate an IEP 
meeting, the facilitator must understand the underlying legal and 
educational issues. Therefore, facilitators need to understand special 
education laws, including, at a minimum, IDEA’s least restrictive 
environment requirement,318 behavioral interventions and strategies,319 
the use of Response To Intervention (RTI) strategies,320 IDEA’s 
discipline provisions,321 availability of extended school year,322 avail-
ability of related services and transition services,323 and compen-satory 
education.324 Facilitators also should be familiar with best practices for 
 
Combined%20State%20Profiles.pdf [http://perma.cc/3UG6-JTWJ] (noting  
that exemplary systems have “early upstream dispute resolution processes”). 
315. See supra Part II.C.1. 
316. See supra Part II.C.1. 
317. See Direction Serv., IEP Facilitation Background and Context, 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/IEPFacilitationBackground 
ContextJobDescription.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z87J-6PPR] (providing a back-
ground for IEP facilitation and job description for an IEP facilitator). 
318. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012). 
319. For an in-depth discussion of behavioral interventions, see Elizabeth A. 
Shaver, Should the States Ban the Use of Non-Positive Interventions in 
Special Education? Re-Examining Positive Behavior Supports Under the 
IDEA, 44 Stetson L. Rev. 147 (2015). 
320. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B) (2012).For a critical analysis of the use of RTI, 
see Colker, supra note 192, at 227–29. 
321. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(E) (2012). 
322. 34 C.F.R. § 300.106 (2007). 
323. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26), (34) (2012). 
324. See Seligman & Zirkel, supra note 153. 
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writing IEPs. Finally, facilitators also need to understand various 
teaching methodologies for educating children with disabilities and the 
range of education placements for children with disabilities. 
It seems that a good understanding of special education law and 
educational methodologies is missing from some current IEP facilitation 
training materials. Training materials largely focus on general conflict 
resolution skills such as setting ground rules for the parties, effective 
communication techniques, dealing with emotional parties and the 
like.325 Indeed, that omission might be a deliberate guard against over-
reach by the facilitator who otherwise might judge the content of the 
parties’ proposals or, even worse, act as an advocate for one party or 
the other.326 Whatever the reasons, it seems that IEP facilitators 
currently receive only “a thumbnail familiarity with the IEP environ-
ment” as part of their training.327 
 
325. Direction Serv., supra note 317 (explaining that CADRE’s description 
of current IEP facilitation practices indicates that, while experience as a 
“facilitator or mediator is usually required” to be an IEP facilitator, a 
“background in special education or knowledge about special education 
programs or law is sometimes considered desirable.”); see also Julie 
Armbrust, IEP Facilitation: Tips of the Trade 2 (2010), http:// 
www.ode.state.or.us/wma/teachlearn/conferencematerials/sped/2010/ 
iepfacilitationtraining.pdf [http://perma.cc/836X-TUWR] (de-emphasizing 
knowledge of the law as a skill in a pyramidal visual where “conflict 
resolution” and “facilitation” skills appear at the wider parts of the pyramid 
and “knowledge of special education law” at the narrow top of the pyramid 
in training materials prepared for school administrators in Oregon); Trisha 
Bergin-Lytton, IEP/IFSP Facilitation Techniques for Success, Webinar 
Presentation (July 10, 2012), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/ 
7.10.12_IEPIFSPFaciltiationTechforSuccess-Webinar.pdf (PDF of a 
PowerPoint presentation by Trisha Bergin-Lytton regarding IEP 
facilitation techniques for success addresses mediation and facilitation 
techniques such as “consensus-as-you-go” and “counter proposal”); see also 
The Office for Dispute Resolution, IEP Facilitation Brochure, 
http://odr-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/IEP-Facilitation-Brochure-
English.pdf [http://perma.cc/WV2F-Z8J3]; Conflict Resolution Ctr. of 
Baltimore Cnty., Independent IEP Facilitators: What Do They Do? What’s 
in it for YOU?, Presentation (2012), http://crcbaltimorecounty.org/newsite/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CRC-IEP-Presentation-in-pdf2.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/6429-Q6TM]. 
326. Trisha Bergin-Lytton, What an IEP/IFSP Facilitator Is and Is Not, 
(Sept. 2011), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitator%20Is%
20Is%20Not-FIEP%20(TBL).pdf [http://perma.cc/3UVY-7MXS]; Nicholas 
R.M. Martin, Supporting the IEP Process: A Facilitator’s Guide 
142 (2010) (noting that facilitators may be barred by state educational 
agencies from discussing the substantive law). 
327. Martin, supra note 326, at 142. This recent text, which is designed to be 
a facilitator’s guide, greatly downplays the notion that IEP facilitators 
should obtain “content knowledge” regarding IDEA provisions, stating 
that “being familiar enough with the terminology to keep up with the 
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Those concerns are valid. However, it seems intuitive—and the 
comments of survey respondents confirm—that an effective facilitator 
should have a good working knowledge of the substantive topics being 
discussed. This is particularly true if one goal of IEP facilitation is to 
level the playing field between school officials and unsophisticated 
parents.328 The facilitator, while not providing legal advice, should have 
enough working knowledge to discern whether the substantive dis-
cussion comports with IDEA’s requirements. 
In addition, facilitators need to understand the limits of the IEP 
facilitation process. A good facilitator should be able to identify a 
dispute that cannot be resolved via IEP facilitation and engage in a 
frank discussion with the parties about the limits of the process. An 
example of such a dispute might involve an issue regarding a child’s 
placement, such as when the parents are seeking a private placement 
that could be expensive for the district. In that circumstance, or any 
others where the parties are entrenched in their positions, the facilitator 
should recognize that the dispute likely cannot be resolved in a 
facilitated IEP meeting. 
A good program of IEP facilitation also should involve oversight. 
States should develop materials to gauge the effectiveness of facilitators 
and the parties’ satisfaction with the process, including their opinion of 
the particular facilitator. With benefit of the parties’ feedback, the 
facilitator can further refine his or her facilitation skills or legal back-
ground. Another benefit of oversight is that the states could determine 
that a particular individual simply is not an effective IEP facilitator 
and remove that person from the list of available facilitators. 
Some states currently do provide an opportunity for participants in 
a facilitated IEP meeting to provide feedback about the experience.329 
In particular, CADRE has collaborated with staff from six educational 
agencies to create an “IEP Facilitation Intensive TA Workgroup” 
whose mission is to “identify[] and develop[] resources, model policies 
and procedures relating to IEP facilitation.”330 This workgroup has 
 
discussion is helpful, but not essential, because if the facilitator is lost, 
there is a good chance that others are lost as well.” Id. 
328. Mueller, supra note 13, at 66. 
329. IEP Facilitation Training Video Resources, Ctr. For Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., (Mar. 2013), http://www.direction 
service.org/cadre/fieptrainingvideos.cfm [http://perma.cc/663B-WHF3]; 
Armbrust, supra note 325; Ctr. For Appropriate Dispute 
Resolution in Special Educ., Facilitated IEP Meetings: An  
Emerging Practice (2004), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/ 
Facilitated%20IEP%20for%20CADRE%20English.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
M2FB-4P8M]. 
330. IEP Facilitation Intensive Workgroup Page, Ctr. For Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., http://www.directionservice. 
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made documents available to evaluate the success of a facilitated IEP 
meeting from the perspectives of the parties and the facilitator.331 If 
IDEA is amended to include a program of IEP facilitation, Congress 
should require the states to use such evaluative tools to assess the IEP 
facilitation program on an ongoing basis. 
Finally, IEP facilitation should be a voluntary ADR mechanism 
that the parties may choose to use; under no circumstances should the 
state require parties to engage in IEP facilitation. Specifically, Congress 
should not adopt the AASA proposal that IEP facilitation be a 
mandatory prerequisite to the filing of a special education due process 
complaint.332 
There are several reasons to reject mandatory IEP facilitation as a 
layer in the due process structure. First, IEP facilitation simply is not 
an appropriate vehicle to resolve every dispute. Some special education 
disputes do not involve an issue about the child’s IEP. For example, if 
a school district determined that a child was not eligible for special 
education services, the district would not proceed to write an IEP. In 
that circumstance, a facilitated IEP meeting is nonsensical. Other 
disputes, while technically involving the contents of the child’s IEP, 
also are not capable of being resolved in a facilitated IEP meeting. 
When parents have unilaterally placed their child in private school, the 
parents cannot obtain tuition reimbursement in a facilitated IEP 
meeting. If IEP facilitation cannot apply to all special education 
disputes, then it should not be a prerequisite to the filing of every 
special education dispute. 
In addition, mandating IEP facilitation runs counter to its core 
principles. One core principle of IEP facilitation is the concept of “self-
determination”, which is a “voluntary, un-coerced decision in which a 
team member makes free and informed choices” as to process and 
outcome.333 Other core principles are that open communication and a 
collaborative environment are keys to success.334 If IEP facilitation was 
mandatory, the parties would not perceive the process as one in which 
they have jointly agreed to make their best effort to resolve a dispute.  
org/cadre/FIEPWorkgroup.cfm [http://perma.cc/MD5M-DZ4U] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
331. Id. 
332. See supra Part II.C.4. 
333. Ctr. For Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Educ., Model 
Expectations of IEP Facilitator Conduct (2013), http://www.direction 
service.org/cadre/exemplar/artifacts/ModelExpectationsIEPFacilitators 
Conduct.pdf [http://perma.cc/5J6X-7ABC]; see also Leonard L. Riskin & 
Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in Court-Ordered 
Mediation, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 863, 871 n.41 (2008) (quoting the Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators). 
334. Mueller, supra note 13, at 63. 
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They would not feel in control of the process. Rather, mandatory IEP 
facilitation will be viewed as just another pre-hearing obstacle. Indeed, 
given the goals of IEP facilitation, “mandating attendance may be the 
worst method of encouraging cooperation between the school and 
parents.”335 
This point is particularly important when one considers the long-
term relationship between parents and their local school district. 
Voluntary IEP facilitation can foster a collaborative relationship, 
improve communication between the parties, and establish and keep 
trust that is necessary to serve the child. Mandatory IEP facilitation 
will cause all participants, regardless of their point of view, to perceive 
the process as something imposed upon them by an external force—the 
law—not as a vehicle they choose to repair or maintain an important 
relationship. 
In that regard, the views of survey respondents are quite telling. 
Regardless of client base, a proposal for mandatory IEP facilitation 
failed to gain widespread support.336 The survey respondents recognize 
that IEP facilitation works because it is a voluntary process in which 
the parties are predisposed to reach resolution. The voluntary nature 
of the process is critical, and it should not be changed. 
B. Eliminate the Resolution Session in Favor of IEP Facilitation 
If IDEA is amended to require the states to offer IEP facilitation, 
Congress should eliminate the requirement of a resolution session. IEP 
facilitation, if done correctly, is a more effective tool to have the parties 
meet and discuss their differences productively. If the states offer IEP 
facilitation conducted by well-trained facilitators, then the resolution 
session, which essentially is an IEP meeting held after a due process 
complaint is filed, should not be necessary. 
Some might assert that the resolution session should remain in the 
due process structure on the theory that it is always beneficial for the 
parties to meet and discuss their differences. I disagree. Each layer in 
the system causes additional cost and delay. The resolution session in 
particular causes delay since it adds an additional thirty days to the 
time allotted from the filing of a due process complaint until a hearing 
officer is required to render a decision.337 
 
335. Andrea Shemberg, Mediation as an Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 12 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 739, 746 (1997) (discussing proposals for mandatory mediation). 
336. See supra Part III.A. 
337. 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b) (2007). I recognize that, in practice, many due 
process matters are not resolved within the 75-day window allotted for 
the resolution session and the hearing. See Colker, supra note 69, at 396–
97 (noting long delays in resolution of due process hearings in Ohio). The 
fact that the deadlines may not be adhered to strictly in practice, however, 
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In addition, the resolution session has not been a “widely used or 
particularly effective” vehicle for resolving disputes.338 In addition, a 
review of data collected by the Office of Special Education Programs 
for the 2011–2012 school year indicates that the resolution session has 
not been effective. In that time period, 17,118 due process complaints 
were filed in the United States and other applicable jurisdictions.339 
Resolution sessions were held in 54% of the matters; thus in nearly one-
half of the disputes, the parties jointly agreed to waive the resolution 
session.340 Of the total due process complaints filed, just 11.6% of the 
disputes were settled during the resolution session.341 
In the most active jurisdictions, the resolution session is only 
marginally successful in resolving a fair number of disputes.342 In the 
nine jurisdictions with the most due process complaints filed 
(California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and Texas), the highest 
settlement rate as a result of the resolution session was Puerto Rico, a 
jurisdiction that only recently has seen increased activity in the field of 
special education disputes.343 In Puerto Rico, the resolution sessions 
resulted in settlements for one-quarter (25%) of all due process 
complaints filed.344 In the District of Columbia, the settlement rate was 
20%.345 Three jurisdictions, Pennsylvania, Texas and Illinois, had 
 
is no reason to keep an ineffective procedure like the resolution session in 
the system when it has a defined time delay. Id.  
338. Reece Erlichman et al., The Settlement Conference as a Dispute Resolution 
Option in Special Education, 29:3 Ohio J. Disp. Resol. 407, 419 n.61 (2014) 
(“In our anecdotal experience, the resolution session is not a widely used or 
particularly effective dispute resolution mechanism in Massachusetts.”). 
339. 2011–2012 IDEA Part B Dispute Resolution, Inventory.Data.Gov, 
https://inventory.data.gov/dataset/7c6916d1-c375-4c4c-9de0-f2b07aac4fc2/ 
resource/5c23f855-4f83-4173-9a08-6928920dd1a6 [http://perma.cc/EV4H-
KA63] (last updated July 3, 2014). Data includes territories, the Bureau of 
Indian Education, “outlying areas” and “freely associating states.” Id. 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: A Follow-
up Analysis, 303 Educ. L. Rep. 1, 1–2 tbl. 1 (2014). 
344. Inventory.Data.Gov, supra note 339. In Puerto Rico, there were 1781 
due process complaints filed; of those matters, a resolution session was 
held in 785 matters, or 44.1% of the total. Id. The resolution session 
settled 439 matters, or 55.7% of the matters in which a resolution session 
was held, or 24.6% of the total filings. Id.  
345. Id. In the District of Columbia, there were 1009 due process complaints filed; 
of those matters, a resolution session was held in 773 matters, or 76.6% of the 
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settlement rates of 15.6%, 12.5%, and 10.8% respectively.346 The 
remaining four jurisdictions, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey and 
California, had settlement rates of 7.8%, 3.8%, 2.1%, and 1.8% 
respectively.347 Thus, one-third of the most active jurisdictions had 
settlement rates of less than 5%. Over one-half of the most active 
jurisdictions had settlement rates of approximately 10% or less. 
The data also indicates that practice varies widely by jurisdiction. 
In New York, for example, the percentage of due process matters in 
which a resolution session was held was quite high. Of the 6,116 due 
process complaints filed in New York, a resolution session was held in 
5,469 matters—89.4% of the total number of complaints. That percent-
age greatly exceeded the national average of 54%. Yet, in New York, 
the resolution session resulted in a settlement in just 7.8% of the due 
process filings, a percentage lower than the national average of 11.6%. 
Thus, the parties in New York largely attend the resolution session but 
have little success settling the matter.348 It may be that New York is 
one of those jurisdictions where the resolution session is being used as 
a litigation strategy, either as a means to obtain free discovery or create 
a record for the due process hearing. 
In New Jersey, the resolution session appears to be ineffective for a 
different reason. In New Jersey, there were 801 due process complaints 
filed in the same time period. Of that total, resolution sessions were 
held in just 20 due process matters—2.5% of the total number of 
complaints. In other words, the parties in New Jersey agreed to waive 
the resolution session for 97.5% of the due process filings. Of the 20 
matters in which a resolution session was held, a settlement was reached 
 
total. Id. The resolution session settled 208 matters, or 27.0% of the matters 
in which a resolution session was held and 20.6% of the total filings. Id.  
346. Id. In Pennsylvania, there were 838 due process complaints filed. Id. Resolution 
sessions were held 374 matters, or 44.6% of the total. Id. The resolution session 
settled 131 matters, or 35.0% of the matters in which a resolution session was 
held and 15.6% of the total filings. Id. In Texas, there were 359 due process 
complaints filed. Id. Resolution sessions were held in 142 matters, or 39.6% of 
the total. Id. The resolution session settled 45 matters, or 31.7% of the matters 
in which a resolution session was held and 12.5% of the total filings. Id. In 
Illinois, 333 due process complaints were filed. Resolution sessions were held in 
94 matters, 28% of the total. Id. The resolution session settled 36 disputes, or 
10.8% of the due process complaints that were filed and 38% of the matters in 
which a resolution session was held. Id.  
347. Id. 
348. Id. The data for California shows a similar trend. In California, 3114 due 
process complaints were filed in the 2011–2012 school year. Id. Resolution 
sessions were held in 457 matters, approximately 14.6% of the total 
complaints filed. Id. The resolution session resolved 56 disputes – a 1.8% 
of the total due process complaints filed and just 12.3% of the matters in 
which a resolution session was held. Id. 
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in 17 matters, or 85% of the disputes in which a resolution session was 
held. Thus, in New Jersey, it appears that the parties largely agree to 
forego the resolution session—a sign that practitioners believe it is 
ineffective—and agree to meet only when it is highly likely that the 
dispute can be settled at the resolution session.349 
While this data is just a “snapshot,” it bolsters the opinions 
articulated by survey respondents and others350 that the resolution 
session is ineffective. In New York, the resolution session is apparently 
ineffective to settle matters even when the session takes place. In New 
Jersey, the resolution session is ineffective as an ADR mechanism 
simply because the parties largely choose not to attend. 
At the time that the resolution session was added to IDEA, comm-
entators and advocacy groups noted a number of concerns.351 One 
concern was that the resolution session was an unnecessarily duplicative 
meeting that would take place only after a dispute had ripened between 
the parties.352 Another concern was that the resolution session, with its 
thirty day timeline, would delay resolution of a dispute.353 A third con-
cern was that the resolution session would be used as a “pressure tactic” 
by school districts to pressure parents to settle the matter quickly.354 
 
349. Id. Data from Massachusetts is somewhat similar. In Massachusetts, 582 
due process complaints were filed, but resolution sessions were held in just 
48 matters, 8.2% of the total filings for the period. Id. The resolution 
session settled 22 disputes, 46% of the total cases in which a resolution 
session was held, but just 3.8% of the total filings. Id. 
350. See Archerd et al., supra note 314, at 92 (noting that Professor Mark 
Weber, a panelist, indicates that mediation is more popular in Illinois than 
resolution meetings; Professor Robert Dinerstein, another panelist, notes 
that ADR efforts are largely unsuccessful in the District of Columbia); Id. 
at 140 (statement of Erin Archerd) (“I was really interested in how negative 
a reaction it sounded like most people were having to resolution sessions, 
which are a relatively recent innovation under the IDEA2004 authorization. 
They added in this resolution session. It sounded pretty universally 
unpopular on this panel.”). 
351. Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to Resolving Special Education 
Disputes: Any New IDEAs?, 5 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 137, 147–53 
(2005) (detailing the concerns and objections of various organizations). 
352. Id. at 150 (quoting an online petition circulated by the League of Special 
Education Voters, which stated the group’s position that, by the type the 
resolution session is held, parents “have had countless meetings with the 
school, making little or no progress” and that “families must not be 
further burdened with extra meetings”). 
353. Id. at 149–50 (quoting an analysis of the statutory amendments published by 
the Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), in which the CEC stated that 
the resolution session “could deny or delay a parent’s right to a hearing”). 
354. Id. at 148. 
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While the concerns about duplication and delay remain valid,355 
additional concerns have arisen over the years. There is the question 
whether the session is used to gain “free discovery” as noted by practit-
ioners356 and others.357 A school district that is not interested in resol-
ving a dispute can nonetheless compel the parents to meet with school 
officials and provide information about “the facts that form the basis 
of the [due process] complaint.”358 An additional concern is that any 
agreement reached in the resolution session can be voided in the days 
following the meeting.359 A third concern is that because the resolution 
session takes place after a due process complaint is filed, the parties 
have the complicating issue of payment of attorneys’ fees if the parents 
have retained counsel.360 
Finally, the resolution session takes place too late in the process to 
enable the parties to openly discuss their disagreements and resolve the 
matter. By the time the resolution session is held, one party or 
another—most often parents361—shifts their focus from negotiation to 
litigation.362 In addition, some parents have retained counsel, a compli-
 
355. Henderson, supra note 166. In 2008, CADRE and Project Forum, conducted 
a survey of special education unit of state educational agencies. The survey 
responses indicated a perception that the resolution session adversely affects 
the timing of dispute resolution, and that “[p]arties who are seeking a more 
speedy resolution are likely to waive the resolution meeting in favor of moving 
to mediation or a due process hearing immediately.” Id. at 13. 
356. See supra Part III.C. 
357. Henderson, supra note 166, at 13; Edwards, supra note 351. 
358. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(B)(i)(IV) (2012). But see Erlichman et al., supra note 
338, at 441. Some school districts apparently do believe that pre-hearing 
meetings or settlement conferences are an opportunity to “receive 
feedback on the merits of their position and then somehow convince the 
opponent to back down or even withdraw their hearing request once they 
have heard how strong the case is for the other side.” Id. 
359. See Archerd et al., supra note 314, at 98 (comments of Esther Canty-
Barnes) (noting that, in New Jersey, resolution session are “rarely held” 
perhaps because of the ability to void any agreements within three days 
after the meeting). 
360. Id. at 103 (comments of Professor Dinerstein) (explaining that attorneys 
representing parents and children in the District of Columbia believe that 
the District of Columbia Public School System uses the resolution session 
to “buy more time” in the process). 
361. Erlichman et al., supra note 338, at 440 (“School districts are most often 
on the receiving end of due process hearing requests filed by parents who 
are dissatisfied with special education services and/or placements . . . .”). 
362. As one practitioner noted: “[O]nce a case moves to mediation or due 
process, it is necessarily adversarial at that point and it is difficult to get 
the parents and the District ‘back on the same page’ for the remainder of 
the student’s time in the District.” Another practitioner stated: “Rarely 
have I had a client come to me that just did not understand what the 
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cating factor in terms of both the litigious nature of the meeting and 
the payment of attorneys’ fees. 
For these reasons, the resolution session should be scrapped in favor 
of a system of IEP facilitation. A facilitated IEP meeting essentially is 
a “resolution session” with certain advantages. First, a facilitated IEP 
meeting will occur before the dispute has ripened to the point where 
one party has filed a due process complaint. Ideally it will take place at 
an early stage of the parties’ interactions with one another, before there 
have been too many fruitless and contentious meetings. Second, the 
presence of the facilitator, if that individual is well trained, should 
ensure that the lines of communication remain open. With an orderly, 
facilitated IEP meeting, the parents may be more confident that the 
school district will conscientiously implement any agreed upon IEP. 
Third, pre-due process filing of IEP facilitation will reduce the need to 
retain counsel and file due process, thereby eliminating the current issue 
of payment of attorneys’ fees for work done by parents’ counsel up to 
the resolution session. 
Finally, eliminating the resolution session also will shorten the 
timeline for resolving a filed due process complaint by thirty days. This 
is an advantage because it allows for a quicker resolution of those 
disputes that require an adjudicated decision. Not every special edu-
cation dispute can be resolved by informal means, and the use of 
informal means should not be used to delay a due process hearing when 
one is necessary to resolve the matter. 
C. Eliminate the Two-Tier Administrative Structure 
Eliminating the option for a two-tier system is another structural 
change that would both increase the efficiency of due process and 
decrease costs. At the time that EAHCA was passed, the second level 
of appeal was criticized by some as unnecessary.363 The two-tiered 
process was justified on several grounds. First, it was argued that the 
two-tier system allowed the state educational agency to enforce the 
statutory provisions for which it was responsible.364 In addition, 
members of Congress apparently believed that the “state administrative 
appeals process . . . afford[ed] a timely, fair system for resolving 
conflicts.”365 In the view of Congress, this administrative appeal process 
 
District was offering and just could not get his/her views heard due to 
misunderstanding. By the time they get to me—a parent attorney—they 
have given up on the collaborative process.”  
363. Stafford, supra note 53, at 78. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. 
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actually would reduce “the number of cases going to court,” thus 
relieving parents of the “heavy financial burden of going to court.”366 
But perhaps the primary reason for including a two-tier system in 
the EAHCA was simply that several states, notably Pennsylvania, had 
created a two-tier structure even before passage of the EAHCA.367 As 
it had with the mechanics of due process notice and hearing, Congress 
copied a structure that already existed. 
A two-tier system, however, clearly increases costs and delay for 
the parties. In two-tier jurisdictions, the second level of review could 
take sixty to seventy-five days to be completed.368 In addition to the 
time delay, the process is complex and onerous. Take the process in 
New York as an example. When a parent appeals a hearing officer’s 
decision to the second tier, the parent must prepare and serve a “Notice 
of Intention to Seek Review” upon the school district within twenty-
five days of the hearing officer decision.369 Not less than ten days later, 
but within thirty-five days of the hearing officer’s decision, the parent 
must prepare and serve a “Petition for Review” on the school district.370 
The Petition for Review also must be filed with the Office of State 
Review of the State Education Department, along with a copy of the 
notice described above and proof of service upon the opposing party.371 
The opposing party then has ten days to file an answer to the petition.372 
 
366. Id. 
367. Id. at 78–79. 
368. Of the seven two-tier states in addition to New York, the time for the 
second level of appeal ranges from sixty to seventy-five days. See N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.9 (2006) (stating that appeal to be filed within 
thirty days of the hearing officer decision; state review to be completed in 
thirty days); Ohio Admin. Code 3301-51-05(K)(14)(b)(i) (2014) (stating 
that appeal to be filed within forty-five days of the hearing officer decision; 
state review to be completed in thirty days); Nev. Adm. Code § 388.315 
(2007) (stating that appeal to be filed within thirty days, and state review 
to be completed thirty days later, although extensions of time may be 
granted); Kan. Admin. Regs. §91-40-51 (2008); 707 K.A.R. 1:340 (2007) 
(noting thirty days to file appeal, with additional thirty days for decision); 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 43-243 (2015). 
369. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 279.2 (2008). The notice is 
provided to the school district in order that it can prepare a written 
transcript of the hearing and forward to the Office of State Review of the 
New York State Education Department the transcript, the hearing 
officer’s decision, and all exhibits used as evidence in the hearing. Id. 
370. Id. 
371. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 279.4(a) (2008). 
372. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 279.5 (2008). The petition for 
review and answer may be up to twenty pages in length. N.Y. Comp. 
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 279.8 (2008). The New York regulations 
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Both the petition and the answer may be up to twenty pages in length 
and must conform to certain pleading standards, including specific 
requirements for citation to the record.373 The state level review officer 
has thirty days to issue a decision, although extensions of time may be 
granted.374 As part of its review, the State Review Officer might seek 
additional evidence or testimony or direct that the parties appear for 
oral argument.375 
The comments of the survey respondents make clear that a great 
majority of special education disputes in which a due process hearing is 
held will not be fully resolved until after the case has been heard in 
federal court. If it is truly the practice that the majority of cases will in 
any event be filed in federal court, then the second level of review in a 
two-tier structure does not serve as a meaningful filter to reduce filings 
in federal court. Without that benefit, the second level of review serves 
only to increase cost and cause delay. 
Perhaps it is the burden and delay that has caused the states to 
increasingly prefer a one-tier structure. In 1988, twenty-four states and 
the District of Columbia had two-tier systems.376 Since that time, the 
states overwhelmingly have moved from a two-tier system a one-tier 
system. Today, just eight states still retain a two-tier system. 
Pennsylvania, an early architect of the two-tier structure, moved to a 
one-tier system in July 2008.377 
Indeed, eliminating the second tier would ease the burden on state 
educational agencies in two-tier states which, under the current system, 
must (a) promulgate rules for procedure, (b) provide parents with 
information and forms about the second level, (c) receive and process 
appeals that have been filed, and (d) hire, train, and pay second level 
review officers. If the second tier were eliminated, those state edu-
cational agencies could shift resources away from managing the second 
tier to improving the quality of service provided in the first tier, an 
improvement in quality that appears to be needed in some current two-
tier jurisdictions.378 Indeed, the quality of hearing decisions at the first 
 
contain detailed requirements for the form of these documents, including 
the manner of citations to the record. Id. 
373. Id. § 279.8 
374. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.5(k) (2014). 
375. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 279.10 (2008). 
376. Zirkel & Scala, supra note 62, at 4. 
377. Id. at 7. 
378. See Colker, supra note 69, at 373 (noting lack of professionalism and poor 
quality in IHO decisions in Ohio). The survey yielded comments from 
practitioners with experience in New York about lack of timeliness and 
professionalism with the second level of review in New York. One such 
comment was: “[I]n the two tier system in NY, the NYS Education 
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level of review might improve greatly if the “backstop” of a second level 
of review was eliminated. 
Eliminating the two-tier structure thus could have multiple benefits 
both to the parties in a special education dispute and the state 
educational agencies responsible for managing the due process system. 
D. Do Not Create Additional Layers in the Structure 
I also recommend that no additional ADR proceedings be “layered” 
into the due process structure. Additional layers increase cost and 
delay, reduce trust in the process, and divert the resources of state 
agencies. A streamlined, well-managed system will produce better 
results than a fractured, multi-option system. 
In particular, the arbitration proposal is an unnecessary addition to 
due process. Both arbitration and due process are adjudication models 
in which an impartial decision maker determines the merits of the 
parties’ positions and, if necessary, a future course of conduct. Thus, 
arbitration is not a mechanism that would resolve a category of special 
education disputes that could not be resolved in a due process 
proceeding. The essential differences between the two forms are (a) the 
ability to appeal to state or federal court and (b) the benefit (offset by 
the cost) of having the case heard before a three-person panel rather 
than a single hearing officer.379 
There is little utility in requiring the states to design and maintain 
two separate adjudication tracks, particularly if Congress were to 
streamline due process by eliminating the second level of review. The 
volume of due process hearings generally has been low.380 In the 2011–
2012 school year, thirty-five states held five or fewer due process 
hearings.381 If IDEA required the states to offer arbitration, those thirty-
 
Department’s Office of State Review considers appeals of decisions issued 
by impartial hearing officers. They typically have no more experience or 
expertise than the impartial hearing officer, yet freely overturn decisions 
without the benefit of actually seeing the testimony when making 
credibility determinations, and they are deemed to have “superior 
expertise in the field of education” so the federal courts defer to the 
decisions of the state review office—decisions issued by individuals with 
less experience than most of the impartial hearing officers, and certainly 
less than a federal judge. Moreover, the decisions of the NYS Office of 
State Review are late—we have cases nearing two years over due [sic].” 
379. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 560–61. I recognize that Professor Rosenfeld’s 
proposal indicates the arbitration panel would take a more active role in 
examining witnesses and reviewing material than a due process hearing 
officer would do. However, at the end of the proceeding, the arbitration 
panel functions as a due process hearing officer in terms of granting relief 
that would be “final and binding.” Id. at 554. 
380. Weber, supra note 16, at 508–09. 
381. Inventory.Data.Gov, supra note 339. 
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five states would have been required to design and maintain two 
adjudicatory structures to handle a very small number of disputes. 
In addition, the arbitration proposal outlined by Professor 
Rosenfeld could adversely affect unrepresented parents. By proposing 
that no attorneys be present in the arbitration proceeding, Professor 
Rosenfeld’s proposal could seriously tilt the balance of power in favor 
of school districts over unrepresented parents.382 School districts surely 
will rely on counsel to prepare for an arbitration even if counsel cannot 
be present at the proceeding itself. Over time, school officials also will 
develop expertise in conducting arbitrations. Thus, parents who 
mistakenly believe that the absence of attorneys somehow levels the 
playing field will in fact be facing a very prepared opponent. That 
scenario exacerbates, not redresses, the inequities of the current system 
in terms of the ability of unrepresented parents to effectively advocate 
for their child. Those inequities would be even further exacerbated if 
unrepresented parents consented to the presence of the school district’s 
counsel at the proceeding.383 
This arbitration proposal also could increase the inequities that 
exist between those parents who cannot afford attorneys and those 
parents who can. Parents who can afford attorneys will not choose 
arbitration because they can “purchase” two important items: (a) the 
benefit of their counsel’s advice during an adjudicated proceeding and 
(b) the right to appeal an adverse decision. Represented parents will 
opt for a traditional due process hearing. Only those parents who 
cannot afford attorneys will opt for arbitration, a proceeding that will 
be presented to them as one that is cheap and fast. Thus, unrepresented 
parents will severely limit their appeal rights and appear without 
representation before a panel vested with “complete discretion”384 on 
important topics such as the use and scope of witness testimony or 
documents,385 all the while facing a very prepared opponent. 
Finally, the arbitration model almost surely will give rise to 
collateral proceedings, particularly on the issue whether unrepresented 
parents truly gave knowing and voluntary consent to opt for a 
proceeding from which they had no right of appeal. Professor Rosenfeld 
himself acknowledges that it will be a “difficult question” to determine 
whether consent to arbitration was truly informed and voluntary.386 
That collateral issue itself could seriously undermine the ability of an 
arbitration model to bring about a quick resolution of a dispute.  
382. The prohibition on the presence of attorneys is meant to “redress the inherent 
inequity of unrepresented parents.” Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 559. 
383. Id. at 554. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. at 559–60. 
386. Id. at 552. 
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The AASA proposal for a mandatory IEP consultant is another 
form of special education dispute resolution that should not be adopted. 
First, it must be noted that the AASA does not propose to add this 
consultancy model as an additional dispute resolution mechanism; 
rather, the AASA proposes a wholesale replacement of the due process 
system of which the consultancy model is one aspect.387 To the extent, 
however, that one would be inclined to pull that piece out of the AASA 
proposal and add it to IDEA as an additional ADR mechanism, I 
recommend against it. 
The AASA says that its consultancy proposal is “similar to” a 
dispute resolution program available in Massachusetts called the 
“SpedEx” program.388 The differences between SpedEx and the AASA 
proposal, however, are huge. The SpedEx program is a voluntary 
program that the parties may agree to use or abandon at any time after 
an IEP has been rejected by the parents.389 Parents do not lose any 
right to proceed with due process at any point.390 In addition, the parties 
are not required to accept the consultant’s proposal, although the 
proposal must be implemented if the parties do accept it.391 Perhaps 
most importantly, the Massachusetts SpedEx program is a little-used 
“ongoing experimental project.”392 In the 2013–2014 school year, there 
was funding for just eight cases.393 
Unlike the voluntary SpedEx program, the AASA proposal would 
mandate the use of an IEP consultant. Requiring that the parties 
implement a consultant-imposed IEP as a prerequisite to litigation 
suffers from several defects. First, not every dispute involves the IEP 
or issues that can be addressed by an IEP consultant. Second, given 
the limited funding available in Massachusetts for this mechanism, one 
wonders about the cost to state educational agencies in hiring and 
paying private psychologists, educators, or behavior analysts the 
consultancy fees necessary to implement this proposal for every special 
education dispute that involves a child’s IEP. For these reasons, no 
such mandatory program should be added to IDEA. 
Finally, Congress should resist proposals to add dispute resolution 
mechanisms that “eliminate the need for attorneys”394 or are “lawyer-
 
387. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 23. 
388. Id. 
389. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 23; Erlichman et al., supra note 338, at 425–
26. 
390. Pudelski, supra note 10, at 23. 
391. Erlichman et al., supra note 338, at 426. 
392. Id. 
393. Id. 
394. Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 551. 
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free.”395 While it is popular to blame lawyers for a variety of evils, this 
call to eliminate them from special education dispute resolution is 
misguided. First, school districts almost invariably will have the ability 
to consult with their counsel. Parents with financial means also likely 
will seek legal counsel and, in most cases, will opt for the dispute 
resolution mechanism that allows them to rely on counsel. Thus, 
encouraging a “lawyer-free system”396 only harms the most unsophist-
icated and least-resourced parents who really need the help. 
More importantly, however, good attorneys can help to resolve 
disputes quickly. In the survey, one parent-child attorney commented: 
“It has been my experience and the experience of other attorneys in the 
state, that the involvement of attorneys increases the probability that 
the case will be resolved.” School district attorneys also attest to the 
value of having attorneys in the process. As noted by the comment of 
one survey respondent:  
The resolution sessions in most cases I have handled, when they 
were successful at resolving the dispute, had the lawyers in 
attendance. In my experience, lawyers for parents will not allow 
their clients to reach agreement at a resolution meeting unless 
and until the lawyer has approved the agreement (and the 
agreement includes a provision for payment of the attorney’s 
fees). It is more efficient if the case is going to get resolved to 
have the lawyers attend. That’s not how the IDEA was intended 
to work, in my view, but it is the practical reality. 
Special education law involves complex legal questions, and a 
competent legal representative is a help to anyone involved in the 
process. To ensure both equity and efficiency, Congress should not 
choose a dispute resolution mechanism that would exclude good 
advisors from the process. 
Conclusion 
The essential goal of special education dispute resolution is to 
resolve the matter quickly so that the child receives the proper 
education as soon as possible. To fulfill this goal, structure matters. A 
fractured system with multiple avenues and options can cause delay, 
increase cost, and reduce trust in the process. A streamlined, well-
managed structure will produce sensible decisions at low cost and 
without delay, ensuring that every day of school will count for the child 
with a disability. 
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